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The Internet has facilitated almost costless communication, and easy access to
copyrighted works worldwide. Legal enforcement has experienced limitations such
that senders can email millions of recipients anonymously, and users can pirate copy-
righted works without legal punishment. What are the economic responses to such
challenges? In this dissertation, I study two such responses: anti-spam mechanisms
and open contents.
I derive conditions under which distribution and care level taken to avoid damages
in open contents are socially efficient or inefficient. Then I report experimental results
on the production of open contents. I compare free-riding, efficiency and spillover
when there are large or small teams using non-modular or modular production. Lastly,
I propose and evaluate an anti-spam mechanism I call an uncensored communication
channel, with the aim of enticing spam-demanders and spam-suppliers to trade in
there instead of the traditional email channels.
In this dissertation, there are five chapters:
Chapter I: Introduction
Chapter II: A Tort Model of Open Contents
Chapter III: Modularity and Team Size in Open Content Experiments
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Contents, such as software, music, films or books, are defined here to be open if one
is free to use, reuse, and redistribute them2. In this dissertation, I use a tort model
to investigate if the individually optimal levels of redistribution and care taken to
avoid monetary losses in open contents are different from the socially optimal levels.
I also run an experiment to investigate if the modularity principle, prevalent in open
source production, can increase efficiency and spillover and reduce free-riding when
team size varies.
1.2.2 Spam
I limit consideration to spam defined as bulk, unsolicited, commercial email ; that
is, effectively identical (but usually randomly disguised) messages sent unsolicited to
large numbers of recipients with the goal of inducing a willing, mutually-beneficial
purchase by the recipients. With this definition (I will call it “spam” for convenience,
but it’s merely one subspecies), I rule out malicious bulk unsolicited email (e.g., email
carrying a virus payload); I rule out deceptive email (e.g., “phishing” messages that
attempt to trick recipients into revealing valuable personal information such as bank
passwords); and I rule out email (though initially unsolicited) sent to a mailing list,
1Jeffrey MacKie-Mason is my coauthor. I would like to thank him for giving me the permission
to use this paper as part of my dissertation.
2This is from the Open Knowledge Definition website, which claims this to be the simplest version
of their more complete definition available at: http://www.opendefinition.org/, accessed December
15, 2009. Other definitions exist, for example, see Newmarch (2000) and Liang (2004). There
are a few related concepts such as user-generated contents (Krumm et al. (2008)), open innovation
(Chesbrough (2004)), user innovation (Von Hippel and Von Krogh (2003)) and the like. A comparison
between these concepts is outside the scope of this research.
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from which one could unsubscribe. What I rule out is not insignificant; I just take
this definition as a starting point and leave the study of other email problems for
future research. I do document that commercial spam is the most prevalent form.
And I have analyzed how the results change when the proportion of malicious and
deceptive email changes.
Defined as what I have done, spam is an instance of a differently-named, well-
known phenomenon: advertising. Using the less-pejorative moniker “email advertis-
ing” might give us a good start on a thoughtful, systematic consideration; certainly,
it might help us recognize that at least this type of spam is not per se evil or morally
deficient (though, as with any advertising, some population subgroups might conclude
that the products advertised might fail that group’s morality test). Nonetheless, I
will use “commercial spam” or just “spam” for short, because I relish the powerful
affective response the term receives, and the opportunity to puncture the pejorative
bubble it engenders.
In this dissertation, I propose and evaluate an anti-spam mechanism called uncen-
sored (open) communication channels. Such channels may contribute to a reduction
in the flow of spam, and at the same time give advertisers a reason to increase the
informative content and quality of their ads, to the benefit of those who do want to
buy goods.
1.3 Extended Abstracts
1.3.1 Chapter II. A Tort Model of Open Contents
The delineation of rights in open contents seems quite unclear to many stake-
holders. There is seldom dedicated staff to verify possible intellectual property in-
fringements for contributions made by volunteers worldwide. For some open contents
such as Wikipedia and open source software, the production involves many amateur
3
innovators whose contributions could decrease when faced with liability for certain
damages. Such damages are largely confined here to those related to copyright actual
damages and profits3,4. Although open contents are supposed to be free to use and re-
distribute, there are liability implications. For example, the current innovator might
not know that the existing work already contains proprietary materials. Vendors who
redistribute or add value to open contents, and users who consume the product could
be liable if the innovator includes copyright infringing works.
The major research question is: Given a liability rule, are the individually optimal
levels of redistribution and care taken to avoid damages in open contents different
from the social optimal levels?
I use a model similar to those in the torts literature (Landes and Posner (1985),
Landes and Posner (1987), Miceli (1997), and Shavell (1980)) to study the inclusion
of value-adding resellers (vendors) who do not need to pay the original sellers (inno-
vators) for production. I model after the SCO-Linux controversy to include an agent
who receives a positive expected payment in intellectual property lawsuits but it is
hard for other agents to contract with this agent ex ante. I then analyze how the
litigation between this agent, vendors, innovators and users affects care levels and
quantities distributed.
Some main results here confirm with the standard results that in general efficiency
requires the lowest cost agents to engage in activity until their marginal costs equal to
that of other agents. And it is well known in the literature (Coase (1960)) that when
3The owner whose copyright has been infringed can choose between two mutually exclusive choices
of damages: i) actual damages and profits ii) statutory damages.
The primary measure of recovery of actual damages is based upon the loss of market value of
the copyrighted work due the infringement. Alternatively, the plaintiff could show the defendant’s
profits from sales of the infringing works.
Statutory damages are outside the scope of this paper because the calculation of such damages
greatly increases the complexity of the model. For example, according to the the statute, the damage
shall not be less than $750 nor more than $30,000 per work infringed. This range will be changed
depending on whether the infringement is committed willfully.
4Some but not all features of the current analysis apply to other intellectual property infringe-
ments related to patents or other damages related to product failures. These are, however, outside
the scope of this paper.
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transaction costs are zero, liability rules are irrelevant and thus care and redistribution
will be socially efficient. But since transaction costs are not zero in reality, the main
contributions here are the derivations of some necessary conditions for efficiency and
sufficient conditions for inefficiency in the context of open contents.
For efficient quantities, it is necessary for the vendors to bear more liability than
the innovator when the marginal spillover effect and the innovator’s care costs of the
marginal copy are high relative to the vendor’s care costs of the marginal copy. For
efficient care, it is necessary for care levels to obey the implicit analytical forms of
the optimal liability shares I have derived.
For inefficient care, I have derived some sufficient conditions related to the inter-
action of liability shares and litigation costs. For example, in the no liability to users
case, efficient care levels cannot be obtained if the litigation costs are too high. In
the no liability to the innovators and vendors case commonly used in open content
licenses, efficient care levels cannot be achieved if there are non-zero litigation costs.
1.3.2 Chapter III. Modularity and Team Size in Open Content Experi-
ments
The open source movement has already challenged the biggest players in the com-
puter science industry. Attempts have been made to broaden the scope to areas other
than software. This chapter focuses on one of these areas called open contents. How
to ensure success in such area using the open source concept? Should principles preva-
lent in coding be also applied to contents? One principle I mainly investigate here is
modularity with different team sizes.
Modularity is deeply rooted in the computer science literature5. The concept
of information hiding, pioneered by Parnas (1972), says that non-modularity is not
optimal if the inner workings of a module overlap with the responsibility of another
5Simon (1962) and Alexander (1964) are some of the earliest works.
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module. For instance, non-modularity implies that errors are serially correlated across
modules. Various experimental studies (e.g. see Camerer (2003) pp. 383 for a
review) show that it is easier to achieve a socially inefficient outcomes (even though
more socially efficient outcomes are also Nash) as team size increases when non-
modularity takes the form of minimum effort games6,7. All these are consistent with
the following theories in the open source context. Baldwin and Clark (2006) (pp.
1126) show theoretically that social efficiency decreases because non-modularity leads
to a higher free-riding level among open source developers. Varying team size and
modularity, Johnson (2002) (pp. 658) shows theoretically that non-modularity is
socially inefficient (due to free-riding) only for large teams of developers.
However, both Baldwin and Clark (2006) and Johnson (2002) assume that the
costs of development are independent across individuals, implying that the spillover
of know-how does not matter in cost saving. This assumption is perhaps a key
deviation from the essential features of open contents. Open contents are free to use,
reuse, and redistribute. This allows individuals to share and redistribute with each
other, without costs, code or methods used. This paper relaxes the cost independence
assumption by allowing some spillover of know-hows.
I have not directly investigated whether and how open contents facilitate learn-
ing. But the data showed that spillover was significantly higher in the non-modular
production. More, this experiment documents a case in which price was at times not
used to coordinate resources in open contents where production was decentralized.
Free-riding, measured as zero price to helpers, was prevalent in the experiment. Large
teams were associated with a higher free-riding level than small teams, and free-riding
was more severe when large teams work in a non-modular production environment.
6A minimum game takes this form. Individual i chooses an effort level from the set of non-
negative integers to maximize his payoff determined by the minimum of the effort levels of all team
members: Payoffi = mini=1 to N{efforti}− costi×efforti. There are multiple equilibria in this game.
Anderson et al. (2001) offers a review of the experimental results and plausible theories.
7This is a particularly important class of games (Camerer (2003), pp.376-7).
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Free-riding resulted in the removal of a signaling function of price for the difficulty
levels of tasks. However, this removal was not sufficient to lead to the catastrophic
outcome of zero payoff. In fact, for one measure of efficiency, small teams were more
efficient than large teams in the non-modular production and efficiency was higher in
the modular production irrespective of team size. If the two team size levels here are
a reasonable approximation to the team size levels in a given firm, here are some im-
plications for managers concerning efficiency: if the production function is restricted
to be non-modular, reduce the team size; with no such restriction, always choose the
modular production function.
1.3.3 Chapter IV. Using Uncensored Communication Channels to Divert
Spam Traffic
I offer a microeconomic model of the two-sided market for the dominant form
of spam: bulk, unsolicited, and commercial advertising email. Most most spam is
advertising, and thus should be modeled as a problem in the market supply and
demand for advertising, rather than the usual approach of modeling spam as pure
social cost to be eliminated. I adopt an incentive-centered design approach to develop
a simple, feasible improvement to the current email system using an uncensored (open)
communication channel. Such a channel could be an email folder or account, to which
properly tagged commercial solicitations are routed without any blocking or filtering
along the way.
Some proposals based on economic incentives have been gaining attention. These
share an important feature with our approach to the problem: they typically are based
on a presumption that users have heterogeneous values for receiving various email
messages. In an experimental investigation of email stamps as a price for obtaining a
recipient’s attention, Kraut et al. (2005) found that charging causes senders to be more
selective and to send fewer messages. This method, however, requires non-spammers
7
to pay a price as well. van Zandt (2004) examines the design of an optimal tax
that minimizes exploitation of attention through information overload. Loder et al.
(2006) propose an attention-bond mechanism in which a sender deposits a monetary
bond to a third-party agent, to be released only if the receiver tells the agent to do
so. Payment systems require substantial infrastructure for full implementation. The
infrastructure necessary for widespread micropayment is lacking, and for successful
adoption into a service exhibiting network effects, such as email, it is likely necessary
that there be early widespread, not incremental, adoption, which is difficult to socially
engineer. Also, there is a norm of free email service. Legitimate senders may resist
paying for outgoing email more strenuously than is strictly justified if they took into
account the system benefits to their recipients.
Technical filters and legal rules raise the cost of delivering spam to readers. Costs
are borne by spammers (who must develop ever-changing techniques for avoiding
filters, etc.), but also by recipients, who spend time doing the difficult filtering and
reviewing that cannot be automated, and paying higher costs for goods to cover the
marketing expenses. On the other hand, an equivalent reduction in the benefits of
spamming (e.g. by moving out spam demanders) should have the same incentive
effect.
In this research, I characterize the circumstances under which spammers would
voluntarily move much of their spam into the open channel, leaving the traditional
email channel dominated by person-to-person, non-spam mail. This is the only sym-
metric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium besides the status quo. I show that under cer-
tain conditions all email recipients are better off when an open channel is introduced.
Only recipients wanting spam will use the open channel enjoying the less disguised
messages and cheaper sale prices, and for all recipients the dissatisfaction associated
with both undesirable mail received and desirable mail filtered out decreases.
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CHAPTER II
A Tort Model of Open Contents
2.1 Introduction
Contents, such as software, music, films or books, are defined here to be open if
one is free to use, reuse, and redistribute them1. The delineation of rights in open
contents seems quite unclear to many stakeholders. There is seldom dedicated staff to
verify possible intellectual property infringements for contributions made by volun-
teers worldwide. For some open contents such as Wikipedia and open source software,
the production involves many amateur innovators whose contributions could decrease
when faced with liability for certain damages. Such damages are largely confined
here to those related to copyright actual damages and profits2,3. For example, the
1This is from the Open Knowledge Definition website, which claims this to be the simplest version
of their more complete definition available at: http://www.opendefinition.org/, visited December 15,
2009. Other definitions exist, for example, see Newmarch (2000) and Liang (2004). There are a few
related concepts such as user-generated contents (Krumm et al. (2008)), open innovation (Chesbrough
(2004)), user innovation (Von Hippel and Von Krogh (2003)) and the like. A comparison between
these concepts is outside the scope of this research.
2The owner whose copyright has been infringed can choose between two mutually exclusive choices
of damages: i) actual damages and profits ii) statutory damages.
The primary measure of recovery of actual damages is based upon the loss of market value of the
copyrighted work due to the infringement. Alternatively, the plaintiff could show the defendant’s
profits from sales of the infringing works.
Statutory damages are outside the scope of this paper because the calculation of such damages
greatly increases the complexity of the model. For example, according to the statute, the damage
shall not be less than $750 nor more than $30,000 per work infringed. This range will be changed
depending on whether the infringement is committed willfully.
3Some but not all features of the current analysis apply to other intellectual property infringe-
ments related to patents or other damages related to product failures. These are, however, outside
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current innovator might not know that the existing work already contains proprietary
materials. Vendors who redistribute or add value to open contents, and users who
consume the product could be liable as well.
The major research question in this paper is: Given a liability rule, are the in-
dividually optimal levels of redistribution and care taken to avoid damages in open
contents different from the social optimal levels?
It is well known in the literature (Coase (1960)) that when transaction costs are
zero, liability rules are irrelevant and thus care and redistribution will be socially
efficient. But transaction costs are not zero in reality. I have derived some necessary
conditions for social efficiency and some sufficient conditions for social inefficiency.
The next section presents some copyright infringement risks and measures to avoid
them. Section 3 uses injurer-victim tort models to derive some optimal liability
and bargaining arrangements across agents to deal with such risks. The last section
concludes.
2.2 Copyright Infringements
The theory in the next section is about some strategic interactions of the users,
innovators, and vendors of open contents. As a motivation, I present in this section
the SCO-Linux controversy that highlights some copyright infringement risks and
measures to avoid them.
SCO has claimed itself to be the “owner of UNIX” through a chain of sales. In
2003, SCO claimed that there had been misappropriation of its UNIX System V code
into Linux. SCO has claimed that there is copyright infringing code in Linux4. SCO
began numerous legal claims and threats against many vendors (e.g. IBM, Hewlett-
Packard, Microsoft, Novell, Silicon Graphics, Sun Microsystems and Red Hat) and
the scope of this paper.
4See SCO Group, Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 578 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. Utah 2009).
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end users5. However, on August 10, 2007 Judge Dale Kimball, hearing the SCO
v. Novell case, ruled that “...the court concludes that Novell is the owner of the
UNIX and UnixWare Copyrights”6. In September 2007, SCO filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection.
Although SCO’s claims so far have not been upheld by the courts and the legal
impact on both Linux and Unix seems minimal, this episode highlights the possibility
that the transaction costs involved in clearing copyrights in open contents ex post is
non-trivial. This points to a demand to clarify such rights ex ante. Vendors could
assist such clarifications especially when there are more profit motives (e.g. spillover
effects to the other markets of the vendors7). For instance, IBM has assisted in
several efforts to maintain a good code pedigree internally at IBM and externally for
much smaller organizations8. Vendors could further sponsor more research to avoid
damages. For example, more legal measures, which prevent intellectual property
owners from hiding for too long (e.g. until some open contents have been widely
adopted) before suing9, could be further studied.
In short, open contents stakeholders are facing uncertainties surrounding intel-
lectual property rights and care levels have been exercised to limit the scale of such
problems ex ante. Given the complicated issues involved in these episodes, I will only
5See http://www.sco.com/scoip/lawsuits/, accessed Nov 1, 2009.
6MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, Civil Case No.2:04CV139DAK, IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION.
7For example, IBM researchers P.G.Capek et al. (2005) write, “We also saw in Linux the possi-
bility of having a unified operating system on our platform...A strategy [at IBM] was planned that
allowed us to add value for our customers in the areas, [which were] clearly in the broad area of
what is called middleware, and not in operating systems.” Also, IBM announced in 2001 to spend
over $1 billion in the next three years on open source projects (P.G.Capek et al. (2005)).
8Such efforts include the Certificate of Originality for the code developed at IBM, the Developer’s
Certificate of Origin for the Linux kernel, and the Contributor License Agreement for the Apache
Software Foundation. See Capek et al (2005), pp. 251, Open Source Development Lab (2005) and
The Apache Software Foundation (2006).
9 In view of SCO v. IBM, Zittrain (2004) argues that copyright law should be “construed in
a way that does not permit a poisoned pea of unauthorized code under the mattress of a massive
software project to effectively compromise the entire work”. He discusses that copyright’s statute of
limitations might be applied to require those claiming copyright infringement to bring such claims
within a three-year (or shorter) window stemming from the targeted software’s initial public release
of source code.
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abstract in the next section slices of the episodes to capture certain decision problems




Consequences not fully specified in a contract can reduce investment (Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)). Unspecified consequences can be
thought of as unclear delineation of rights, which results from the absence of right
to contract (Cheung (1970)) or the high transaction costs of specification. Without
a detailed investigation of the transaction costs involved, it is inconclusive that any
reduction in investment is socially inefficient. If it is due to high transaction costs,
then one could argue that the status quo is efficient because society otherwise needs
to find ways to reduce such transaction costs. If it is due to the absence of rights,
then one could argue that the status quo is not efficient if the provision of rights
is costless. This is because when property rights are clearly defined, social efficiency
will be achieved by subsequent contracting as long as transaction costs are low (Coase
(1960)). I will contrast the optimal choices when there is or is not a right to contract.
More specifically, I consider a case in which there are still high transaction costs
to contract with Hidden, defined as an agent claiming to be the intellectual property
right owner. Hidden, similar to what SCO has done, does not surface until later stages.
However, I vary the transaction costs (or equivalently, for our purpose here, the rights)
of contracting between innovators, value-adding vendors (resellers or redistributors)
and users.
To model overlapping of rights in open contents, I present the decision problems of
several active agents in the economy relevant to the open contents landscape: social
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planner, users, innovators, and vendors. In addition, Hidden is an inactive agent who
passively collects receipts from users, innovators, and vendors.
In some bilateral-care accident or product liability models (Landes and Posner
(1985), Landes and Posner (1987), Miceli (1997), and Shavell (1980)), each agent
chooses care and activity levels to adjust damages (or monetary losses). They may
or may not have engaged in a market transaction (e.g. a faulty purchased fan causes
a house fire, versus an auto accident.) I use such models to incorporate a third
party called vendors. Vendors may or may not engage in market exchanges with the
innovators or the users but will choose some care and activity levels. The care levels
here refer to the efforts, measured in monetary amount, made to avoid some expected
damage paid to the inactive agent. The level of activity, Q, is the number of copies
of the same information good distributed by the innovators and the vendors.
The damages are due to intellectual property infringements. They are paid to
Hidden and thus one form10 of unclear delineation of rights is incorporated in the
model since it is not possible to enter into contractual arrangements with Hidden11. I,
therefore, have not explicitly modeled the actions of this inactive agent. Now consider
only the representative agent approach in modeling the active agents. Hereafter I use
the singular and plural forms of these active agents interchangeably. Also, subscript
j = v, u, i stands for the vendor, user, and innovator. Let Kj(Qlj) be the total
care cost of agent j when agent j chooses care level lj for each of the Q copies of
the information goods available in the market. Note that the care applies to all
existing stocks of open contents. This captures the case in which all copies of the
same information good is free from the liability of an infringing part if it is discovered
once and is removed in the current and subsequent copies. Denote D(lv, li, lu) the
10Another form arises when innovators, vendors and users cannot contract with each other. See
discussions before Corollary II.3.
11Since Hidden is by construction hidden, there is no way to contract with them and thus its
decision problem is absent in the model. This is not to say that there are no other intellectual
property owners that you can contract with. For example, not all trolls are hidden if they jump out
of the bush early and negotiate a contract with other agents.
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unit expected damage for each of the Q copies of the information goods12. D(·) is a
strictly concave function with Dj < 0.
The liability for active agent j, s̄j, is defined to be the fraction of D that j pays
in expectation.
Let b(Q) be the marginal consumption benefit for a representative user of the
information good. There is diminishing marginal benefit because by assumption b′ <
013. Let ci(·) be the total production cost of an innovator. R is the price paid to
either the innovators or the vendors depending on who delivers the copy to the user.
Before I present the decision problems of the active agents, let us assume that the
profit function of Hidden is:
Πh = (1− θ)QD − Fh (2.1)
where θ is the ratio of litigation costs due to intellectual property infringement law-
suits, and Fh is the fixed cost of having the court to rule that Hidden has a claim
on the intellectual property with a positive probability. Such fixed cost captures, for
example, that Hidden needs to incur a cost to produce part of the open contents14.
2.3.2 The Users’ Problem
The problem for the users is assumed to be equivalent to the one solved by a
representative user. Assume that there is only one piece of information good to be
produced, which requires a fixed cost of Fi. Innovators distribute qi copies of it.
12The linearity of the total damages is only an approximation to actual damages in the copyright
context.
13One could argue that for open contents such as open source software, there are network effects
because the more copies circulated the higher is the marginal value to the users because they could
share files with each other. However, some form of diminishing returns must be showing at some
point to rule out infinite sales, which we do not observe in the real world. For simplicity, I have
considered only cases in which diminishing marginal benefit is consistent with the cases that either
Q is already expected to be so large that there is no more positive network effects, or there are no
intrinsic network effects.
14One could further extend this model by allowing Hidden to choose some actions such as the
timing of litigation.
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Vendors distribute qv of it. The user buys from either of them. In equilibrium,
qv + qi = Q (2.2)
The risk-neutral user buys a total of Q copies at a unit price of R each, and chooses




b(h)dh−Q[R + s̄uD(lv, li, lu)]−Ku(Qlu) (2.3)
where ∂R
∂Q
= 015, and s̄u is the expected liability share of the users for the damage. The
care level refers to the caution the user takes to ensure that the intellectual property
rights are cleared, and that the information good is properly chosen, maintained and






b(Q) = R + s̄uD +K
′
ulu (2.5)
2.3.3 The Innovator’s Problem
In this model, an information good is not serviceable unless it is thoroughly doc-
umented and provided with customer support. For instance, a large qi increases the
need to provide differentiated documentation for different types of users. For each
copy sold by the innovator, a marginal cost of c′i(·) will be incurred by the innovator.
The total variable cost of production is ci(·). In addition, the innovator also chooses
a care level li for each Q (important, not qi, because it is open content), to directly
adjust the total expected damage QD. The total care cost, Ki(Qli), increases with
15Recall that this user is a representative user, who represents n identical users who are small
relative to the whole market. That is why they are price-takers.





Q. This is to capture the case that the innovator needs to patch each of the copies
circulated to remove the infringing code.
For simplicity, there is only one innovator who is selected from competition. Thus,
the innovator makes zero profit. The problem for the innovator is to choose qi and li
to maximize:
Πi ≡ qiR− Fi − ci(qi)−Qs̄iD(lv, li, lu)−Ki(Qli) (2.6)








R = c′i(qi) + s̄iD +K
′
ili (2.8)
2.3.4 The Vendor’s Problem
There is one vendor who is selected from competition. Thus, the vendor makes
zero profit. The vendor competes with the innovator to resell the open contents since
downstream licensing is royalty free. The vendor incurs a cost cv(·) to redistribute
some copies of the good created by the innovator.
On the other hand, this vendor enjoys some net spillover benefits, ω(Q), of the
stock of copies in the economy. For example, the vendor might be selling a comple-
mentary product in another market. The vendor’s profit function is:
Πv ≡ qvR− cv(qv) + ω(Q)−Qs̄vD(lv, li, lu)−Kv(Qlv) (2.9)
It implies that even if qv = 0, as long as qi > 0, this vendor might find it beneficial to
incur Kv(Qlv) to adjust the total expected damage QD
17. The first order conditions
17The debate (Boldrin and Levine (2002), Klein et al. (2002), and Romer (2002)) focuses on the
necessity of intellectual property in face of the new sharing technologies such as Napster. This paper









R + ω′(Q) = c′v(qv) + s̄vD +K
′
vlv (2.11)
2.3.5 The Decentralized Equilibrium
(2.2), (2.4), (2.7) and (2.10) together with the five equations below characterize
the equilibrium given the liability rules. Since s̄v + s̄u + s̄i = 1, the decentralized
equilibrium level q+i satisfies the following equation, obtained from the combination
of (2.5) and (2.8)18:





Also, the decentralized equilibrium level q+v satisfies the following equation, obtained
from the combination of (2.5) and (2.11)19:
b(Q) = −ω′(Q) + c′v(qv) + (s̄u + s̄v)D +K ′vlv +K ′ulu (2.13)
Free entry implies these zero profit conditions of the innovator, vendor and Hidden,
respectively:
qiR = Fi + ci(qi) +Qs̄iD +Ki(Qli) (2.14)
qvR + ω(Q) = cv(qv) +Qs̄vD +Kv(Qlv) (2.15)
(1− θ)QD = Fh (2.16)
software files. The sharing of software allows resellers to help increase the quality of the software
by, for example, sharing the efforts to fix software vulnerabilities.
18To be more precise, q+i is still a best response function wrt qv. But we do not need to explicitly
solve for it for comparative statics.
19Similarly, q+v is still a best response function wrt qi.
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2.3.6 The Centralized Equilibrium
The social planner’s problem I use here is to choose lv, lu, li, qi and qv to maximize
the total welfare in this additive form:




b(h)dh+ ω(Q)− ci(qi)− cv(qv)−Kv(Qlv)




b(h)dh+ ω(Q)− ci(qi)− cv(qv)−Kv(Qlv) (2.19)
−Ku(Qlu)−Ki(Qli)− θQD − Fi − Fh (2.20)
Conditional on there being a litigation, (1− θ)QD is just a transfer between the
agents, if the social planner does not care about its distribution among the agents,
the role of liability shares is just to induce the most efficient care takers to reduce the
damages. That is why only θ portion of the total expected damage is left in the last
equation because the social planner still cares about how to reduce the dissipative
litigation costs. Considering interior solutions20, the first order conditions are:
K ′v + θDlv = 0 (2.21)
K ′u + θDlu = 0 (2.22)
K ′i + θDli = 0 (2.23)
b(Q) = −ω′(Q) + c′i(qi) +K ′vlv +K ′ulu +K ′ili + θD (2.24)
b(Q) = −ω′(Q) + c′v(qv) +K ′vlv +K ′ulu +K ′ili + θD (2.25)
20Here I assume the Inada conditions limlj→0
∂D(·)
∂lj
= −∞ and limlj→∞
∂D(·)
∂lj
= 0. These guarantee
a unique interior solution for the care levels. For qv and qi, we assume that it is strictly positive
because we have to start with some strictly positive qi for vendors to redistribute. qv = 0 is an
uninteresting case.
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2.3.7 Efficiency of Decentralization
When the values of the decentralized and centralized equilibrium variables (de-
noted by + and ∗) coincide, the decentralized choices are efficient.
Quantities
Proposition II.1. Given some strictly positive care levels, the liability rules are irrel-
evant for q∗i and q
∗




v are not necessarily







K ′ili + s̄iD = K
′
vlv + s̄vD − ω′(Q).
Proof. s̄v, s̄u, and s̄i are absent in (2.24) and (2.25). Recall that the centralized






i ). For this to hold at the decentralized level,
from (2.12) and (2.13), we have c′v(q
+




i ) ⇐⇒ K ′ili + s̄iD = K ′vlv + s̄vD −
ω′(Q)
The intuition is the following. The marginal revenue of redistribution is constant.
For both the innovator and vendor to make zero profit, their total marginal costs
should be the same. From (2.26), the social planner wants the marginal distribution
costs to be the same for both the innovator and vendor. This implies that the rest of
the marginal costs must be the same. The rest of the marginal costs for the innovator
are K ′ili + s̄iD and the rest for the vendor are K
′
vlv + s̄vD − ω′(Q)21.
21One can also see it this way. The zero profit condition of the innovator implies that R = c′i(qi)+





Equating these two implications and then apply c′v(q
+




i ), we have K
′





Rewriting the condition K ′ili + s̄iD = K
′
vlv + s̄vD − ω′(Q), we have (s̄v − s̄i)D =
K ′ili −K ′vlv + ω′(Q). One implication is that to have efficient quantities produced, a
necessary condition is that the vendor should bear more liability than the innovator
when the marginal spillover effect ω′(Q) and the innovator’s care costs of the marginal
copy, K ′ili, are high relative to the vendor’s care costs of the marginal copy, K
′
vlv.
Care Levels Now, let us compare the care levels by comparing the equilibrium care
levels l+v , l
+
u , and l
+







(2.21), (2.22), and (2.23).
Proposition II.2. Efficient care levels can be achieved when these necessary condi-
tions are satisfied:






















. Equating (2.10) with (2.21),










Note that for j = i, v, s̄j is increasing in the litigation cost, j’s share of quantity
supplied (qj/Q), and the rate of change of the unit price w.r.t. j’s care level. s̄j is
decreasing in the rate of change of the damage function w.r.t. j’s care level. The
intuition is that j should bear a higher liability share cost if it is supplying relatively
more than the other supplier else there will not be zero profits because j has to
exercise care to the copies distributed by itself and the other supplier. j should bear
an even higher liability share cost if it is compensated more through the unit revenue
for more of its care level else its zero condition will be violated. But j should bear
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a lower liability share cost if Dli increases, that is, it is becoming less effective in
reducing damage through its care. s̄u can be interpreted in a similar way but with
the direction reversed for the rate of changes.
Recall that in the beginning of this theory section, I want to model some cases
when there are high transaction costs or some rights are absent. Now consider the
cases if some forms of bargaining are not feasible because of these reasons. Specifically,
consider these restrictions:






The lower bound of the first restriction says that one cannot take the liability as
a revenue source. Its upper bound implies that one cannot pay more than what the
damage is worth. The second restriction says that the price could be independent of
either lv, lu or li.
Here are several corollaries that hold largely because some zero profit condition(s)
must be violated otherwise:
Corollary II.3.
∀j = i, v : ∂R
∂lj
= 0 ⇐⇒ s̄j = θ (2.32)
∀j, j′ = i, v : ∂R
∂lj
= 0 ⇐⇒ s̄j′ = 0, j 6= j′ (2.33)
Proof. The first equation is trivial by Proposition II.2 since qi, qv, Dlv 6= 0. For the
second equation, from the zero profit condition of the vendor (2.15), ∂R
∂li
= 0 ⇐⇒






For Q > 0, ∂R
∂lj
= 0 implies that the first order condition of innovator or vendor
becomes s̄jDlj = K
′
j. This is a marginal revenue equals marginal cost condition
for the individual’s optimization problem. Recall that the corresponding marginal
revenue equals marginal cost condition for the social planner’s optimization problem
is: θDlj = K
′
j. So for the decentralized choices of care levels to be socially optimal,
these two conditions need to be equal, giving s̄j = θ.
Corollary II.4. When the price is invariant to the care levels of the innovator and




= 0, efficient care levels cannot be achieved if θ 6= 0.




= 0, s̄v = s̄i = 0. This violates
s̄v = s̄i = θ by the previous corollary since θ 6= 0.
Corollary II.5. If θ ≥ 1
2
, s̄v > 0 and s̄i > 0, the decentralized choices are efficient
only if s̄u < 0.




Then by Proposition (II.2), s̄i > θ. Similarly, s̄i > 0 and the zero profit condition of
the innovator (2.14) implies that ∂R
∂lv
< 0 and s̄v > θ by Proposition (II.2). Together
with s̄v + s̄u + s̄i = 1, we have s̄u < 1− 2θ ≤ 0 if θ ≥ 12 .
One implication is that in the no liability to users case (s̄u = 0), efficient care
levels cannot be obtained if the litigation costs are too high (θ ≥ 1
2
).
Corollary II.6. If s̄v = s̄i = 0, efficient care levels cannot be achieved if θ 6= 0.
Proof. s̄v = s̄i = 0 =⇒ ∂R∂li =
∂R
∂lv
= 0 by Corollary (II.3). Then by Corollary (II.4),
efficient care levels cannot be achieved if θ 6= 0.
Another implication is that for the no liability to the innovators and vendors case
(s̄v = s̄i = 0), commonly used in open content licenses, efficient care levels cannot be
achieved if there are non-zero litigation costs (θ 6= 0).
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2.4 Conclusions
I used a tort model to study the inclusion of value-adding resellers (vendors)
who do not need to pay the original sellers (innovators) for production. I modeled
after the SCO-Linux controversy to include an agent who receives a positive expected
payment in intellectual property lawsuits but it is hard for other agents to contract
with this agent ex ante. I then analyzed how the litigation between this agent,
vendors, innovators and users affects care levels and quantities distributed.
Some main results here confirm with the standard results that in general efficiency
requires the lowest cost agents to engage in activity until their marginal costs equal
to that of other agents. The main contributions here are the derivations of some nec-
essary conditions for efficiency and sufficient conditions for inefficiency in the context
of open contents.
For efficient quantities, it is necessary for the vendors to bear more liability than
the innovator when the marginal spillover effect and the innovator’s care costs of the
marginal copy are high relative to the vendor’s care costs of the marginal copy. For
efficient care, it is necessary for care levels to obey the implicit analytical forms of
the optimal liability shares I have derived.
For inefficient care, I have derived some sufficient conditions related to the inter-
action of liability shares and litigation costs. For example, in the no liability to users
case, efficient care levels cannot be obtained if the litigation costs are too high. In
the no liability to the innovators and vendors case commonly used in open content
licenses, efficient care levels cannot be achieved if there are non-zero litigation costs.
This research is not without limitations. One cannot immediately conclude that
the real world values are not optimal when there is a deviation from the theoreti-
cal values because the transaction costs associated with one or more variables could
simply be too high. Further empirical research could be done to identify what mea-
sures, with less transaction costs, are used for adjustment in place of those variables
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that appear to be deviating from the theoretical values. For example, the theoretical
liability shares here could be proxied by several non-mutually exclusive observables
in addition to those provisions in the open content licenses. If the liability shares in




Modularity and Team Size in Open Content
Experiments
3.1 Introduction
The open source movement has already challenged the biggest players in the com-
puter industry. Attempts have been made to broaden the scope to areas other than
software. This paper focuses on one of these areas called open contents. Contents,
such as software, music, films or books, are defined here to be open if one is free to
use, reuse, and redistribute them1. How to ensure success in such area using the open
source concept? Should principles prevalent in coding be also applied to contents?
One principle I mainly investigate here is modularity with different team sizes.
Modularity is deeply rooted in the computer science literature2. The concept
of information hiding, pioneered by Parnas (1972), says that non-modularity is not
optimal if the inner workings of a module overlap with the responsibility of another
module. For instance, non-modularity implies that errors are serially correlated across
1This is from the Open Knowledge Definition website, which claims this to be the simplest version
of their more complete definition available at: http://www.opendefinition.org/, accessed December
15, 2009. Other definitions exist, for example, see Newmarch (2000) and Liang (2004). There
are a few related concepts such as user-generated contents (Krumm et al. (2008)), open innovation
(Chesbrough (2004)), user innovation (Von Hippel and Von Krogh (2003)) and the like. A comparison
between these concepts is outside the scope of this research.
2Simon (1962) and Alexander (1964) are some of the earliest works.
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modules. Various experimental studies (e.g. see Camerer (2003) pp. 383 for a
review) show that it is easier to achieve a socially inefficient outcomes (even though
more socially efficient outcomes are also Nash) as team size increases when non-
modularity takes the form of minimum effort games3,4. All these are consistent with
the following theories in the open source context. Baldwin and Clark (2006) (pp.
1126) show theoretically that social efficiency decreases because non-modularity leads
to a higher free-riding level among open source developers. Varying team size and
modularity, Johnson (2002) (pp. 658) shows theoretically that non-modularity is
socially inefficient (due to free-riding) only for large teams of developers.
However, both Baldwin and Clark (2006) and Johnson (2002) assume that the
costs of development are independent across individuals, implying that the spillover of
know-how does not matter in cost saving. This assumption is perhaps a key deviation
from the essential features of open contents. In practice, individuals share with each
other code or methods used. This paper relaxes this assumption by allowing some
spillover of know-hows. Meanwhile, the game settings here are also quite different5.
This is because this paper does not aim to directly test the above theories in an exact
environment. I only report the results on similar considerations from a laboratory
setting that perhaps captures more external validity than those theoretical studies,
and that allows us to vary team size and the degree of modularity in a tractable
manner.
Section 3.2 presents the experimental design and procedures. Hypotheses are
presented in Section 3.3. An empirical analysis is presented in Section 3.4. Section
3A minimum game takes this form. Individual i chooses an effort level from the set of non-
negative integers to maximize his payoff determined by the minimum of the effort levels of all team
members: Payoffi = mini=1 to N{efforti}− costi×efforti. There are multiple equilibria in this game.
Anderson et al. (2001) offers a review of the experimental results and plausible theories.
4This is a particularly important class of games (Camerer (2003), pp. 376-7).
5For example, the above theoretical works only study simultaneous games with restricted cost
structures while this experiment allows for sequential games without such restrictions. One tradeoff
is that the game is too complicated to solve. That said, I will not provide a Nash nor claim that
such equilibrium exists.
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3.5 concludes. Appendix A reviews the strategies for the game the subjects were
asked to solve. Appendix B contains the instructions to subjects.
3.2 Experiment
The experiment is a factorial design with modularity and team size as factors.
An open content production process is simulated based on a popular board game
called MASTERMIND6. The next subsection explains the rules of MASTERMIND
and provides justifications about using it for open content experiments. Appendix A
reviews the strategies that solve the traditional (standalone) MASTERMIND. The
second subsection presents the experimental design
3.2.1 Open Contents and MASTERMIND
The rules of MASTERMIND are simple. In a popular version of MASTERMIND,
there are pegs in 6 colors used by a combination–breaker and pegs in black and white
used by the combination–setter. For each game, a combination of 4 color pegs is
set secretly by the combination–setter so the search space is 64. The combination–
breaker’s task is to guess the secret combination. For each guess, the combination–
setter uses black and/or white pegs to give hints to the combination–breaker. A black
peg means that the color and position of a guessed peg are correct; a white peg means
that the color of a guessed peg is correct but not the position.
Mathematically, the secret combination is defined as S = {s1, s2, ..., sN}, where sn
is the nth peg with color s, s ∈ [1, k], k = the number of colors, and N = the length
of the combination or the number of slots.
The tth guess is defined as ht = {ht1, ht2, ..., htN}, where htn is the nth peg with color
6MASTERMIND is a registered trademark of Hasbro International Inc. It is not uncommon
to adopt ready-made games in experiments. For instance, Andreoni and Varian (1999) ran an
experiment using a card game a few years ago.
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h, h ∈ [1, k]. H = {h1, ..., ht} is a history of guesses7.
H in MASTERMIND is a reasonable proxy for open contents in a sense that
both H and many examples of open contents contain an algorithm8 that is publicly
observable, and H is free to use, reuse, and distribute in the experiment.
3.2.2 Experimental Design
This experiment retained the rules of MASTERMIND except that at any time
subjects could post unfinished games to the public pool where everyone could see
the complete history of moves of the posted games. Each game posted must be
accompanied by a possibly different non-negative commission price, chosen by the
poster. The one who solved it first got the commission price transferred from the
reward of the poster to this person. Anyone who solved a posted game must clone the
posted game first so a copy of the history of work already done would be displayed on
the screen for this person to continue the work. The exact number of clones cannot be
observed by the participants. Everyone was allotted three games, each with a random
secret combination, in each period. There was a $1 potential reward for either solving
a game by oneself or having other people to solve it through the public pool.
The experiment is a two-by-two factorial design with production i and team size
j as factors where i =modularity (M) or non-modularity (NM) and j =large (L) or
small (S). In the modular production, the potential reward was immediately credited
to the subjects’ earnings. In the non-modular production, the potential reward was
credited only if all allotted games for every subject were solved–this is also called the
7Each hint is the pair of numbers b(ht, S) and w(ht, S), that is, the number of black and white
pegs. b(ht, S) is the number of subscripts n such that sn = hn. w(ht, S) = [maxp b(ht, p)]− b(ht, S),
where p is a vector from the set of vectors containing all permutations of the S vector. See Chvatal
(1983).
8By categorizing the works of Alan Turing, Kurt Godel, and Alonzo Church (1930’s) on Turing
Machines and Recursive Functional Theory, Dennett (1995) listed these features of an algorithm: 1.
Substrate neutral, only logic matters. 2. Straightforward recipe. 3. Deliver wanted results every
time.
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O-ring requirement9. In other words, the total production (or payoff) of a team was
zero if either one of its members failed in the NM production.
In each session, there were 10 periods, each of which was seven minutes long. Each
period ended when the time limit was reached.
3.2.3 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was conducted on networked computers with human subjects in
the School of Information Lab at the University of Michigan. The author developed
a software that is a collaborative version of MASTERMIND. There were 16 subjects
for the large teams and 4 subjects for the small teams. A total of 88 students were
recruited10. They were mostly undergraduate students at the University of Michigan.
Students already subscribed to the mailing lists of the labs received notice of the
experiment. The interested students then signed up for the experiment through an
online recruitment system on a first-come-first-served basis. Each session lasted for
two hours. No subjects participated in more than one session. Almost all students
finished the instructions in half an hour. A quiz was administered before the exper-
iment began. The experimenter went to the carrels to check the answers. If there
was a mistake, the experimenter explained to him or her individually. Individual
anonymity was maintained through out the experiment; subjects did not know the
real world identities of the players in the software. There was a two-minute trial
period before Period 1. The average payoff without the show-up fee was $15.511. The
9It is so named, also by Kremer (1993), to capture the idea that a very insignificant part of
a system can cause a complete failure. This is exemplified by the explosion of the space shuttle
Challenger in 1986, which was caused by the failure of the O–rings.
10The size of the large team was chosen to accommodate the capacity of the lab, and the size of
the small teams was chosen to allow greater separation of two sizes in case less than 16 subjects
showed up. A size of less than 4 seemed to be too small and anonymity could become a big issue.
11Due to the nature of the non-modular production, students could end up getting nothing but
the show-up fee. The show-up fee was adjusted upwards for all subjects in the same session after
the experiment if there were subjects getting particularly low payments; this had not be announced
during the experiment. The adjustments were made such that the total payoff was around $20.
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Figure 3.1: Features of Experimental Design
features of the whole experiment is summarized in Figure 3.112.
3.3 Hypotheses
The general null hypothesis is no difference. The following hypotheses are the
alternative hypotheses.
In both Baldwin and Clark (2006) and Johnson (2002), an individual free-rides if
he or she does not complete a task while some other individuals do. In our experiment,
this is analogous to this: A subject free-rides if he or she sets a commission price of
zero in a posted game. The following hypothesis is formulated according to the above
analogy13:
Hypothesis III.1. Free-riding in the modular production is less than that in the
non-modular production.
Issac and Walker (1988) and Issac et al. (1994) find that group size does not
12We also conducted some with-subject pilot sessions, which together with the 2-by-2 design here
would complete a Solomon four-group design. Statistical tests for Solomon four-group design are
known to be tough. Not until the recent decade do we find perhaps more successful methods such
as van Engelenburg (1999): “Although the [Solomon four-group] design has been proposed half a
century ago, no proper data analysis techniques have been available. In this paper, it is described
how data from the Solomon four-group design can be properly analyzed using maximum likelihood
regression analysis.” Unfortunately, I cannot rely on this method because it turned out that the
data violate the normality assumption required by the maximum likelihood regression. One could
also perform other statistical tests but none of these are directly related to the hypotheses here or
do they fully utilize all the available data in the design.
13I will show in the results section that the statistical results are quite robust to different measures
of free-riding.
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matter when the cost of contribution is low but group size increases contribution at
a decreasing rate when the cost of contribution is high. Andreoni (2007) shows that
as group size increases, the average contribution will decline. This is not because of
increased free-riding but congested altruism changes the value of the social surplus
to the contributor14. However, (Kagel et al. (1995), pp. 151-3) claim that most
economists expect group size to be positively related to free-riding. It seems important
to test the effects of group size against such “common sense” of economists:
Hypothesis III.2. Free-riding is less for small teams than that in large teams.
In Johnson (2002), when the number of developers exceeds a threshold, modular
software is more likely to be completed. Else, non-modular software is more likely
to be completed. This is because “nonmodularity will sometimes temper [with] free-
riding” (Johnson (2002), pp. 660). The next two hypotheses are consistent with
this.
Hypothesis III.3. Free-riding is less (more) in non-modular than modular produc-
tion for small (large) teams.
Hypothesis III.4. Efficiency is higher (lower) in non-modular than modular pro-
duction for small (large) teams.
Consistent with Parnas (1972), the following seems to be consistent with the
computer scientists’ expectations:
14Andreoni (2007) models contribution to groups as a congestible public good. The congestion is
in the hearts of the altruists rather than in the technology of the public good. Assume that Π0 is
the total social surplus generated for others by the dollars forfeited. Let π0 = Π0/n be the average
surplus for others. For a non-congested good, an individual contributor views the contribution, g,
as being the total social surplus, independent of n. Then g0 = Π0 = nπ0. For a congested good, an
individual contributor views the contribution, g, as being the average social surplus, independent of
n. Then g1 = Π0/n = π0. Assuming that the actual behavior might be a mixture of both, captured
by g = gb0g
1−b
1 = n
bπ0, he estimates that b is 0.68. That is, as group size increases, altruism of the
givers is congested and the value of the contribution to the giver does not grow proportionately with
the social value of the public good.
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Hypothesis III.5. Efficiency is higher in the modular production than in the non-
modular production.
If one believes that this experiment captures some salient features of the mini-
mum effort games, the following hypothesis seems reasonable because it is hard to
coordinate with more team members to reach the more efficient equilibrium in such
games (see Camerer (2003), pp. 383).
Hypothesis III.6. In the non-modular production, efficiency is higher for small
teams.
In contrast to Baldwin and Clark (2006) and Johnson (2002), this paper allows
some spillover of know-hows. A question is whether subjects would behave such that
the usual behavior in the minimum effort games no longer hold. That is, some people
choose a rather high effort level in the current period such that their knowledge can
be learned by others to solve games in future periods. Consistent with this suspicion,
the next hypothesis is formulated as:
Hypothesis III.7. Spillover is higher in the non-modular production.
3.4 Results
There are three dependent variables: free-riding, efficiency and spillover.
Free-riding is measured using three methods. Throughout the analysis, I stick
with the first method and list the discrepancies whenever it applies. The first method
measures the percentage of posted games set at zero commission with respect to all
allotted games. The second method uses the percentage of posted games set at zero
commission with respect to all posted games. The third method measures free-riding
the same as the first method except that I only count those posted games, set a
zero commission, that have been solved by a person other than the poster. The last
method is used to capture the supply of and the demand for free-riding.
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Efficiency is measured as the percentage of profits made over maximum profits. I
also use a second measure, the percentage of completed games over all allotted games.
These two measures coincide in the modular production but differ in the non-modular
production. If only one game were not solved in the non-modular production, the
first measure gives zero efficiency but the second gives positive efficiency.
Spillover is measured as the percentage of posted games over total allotted games.
One can argue that for knowledge to be spread, it is necessary that a game must
be posted first. In this sense, unless a game spreads negative know-hows, spillover
should be positively related to the number of posted games.
In Figure 3.2, I group all data into four cells varying modularity and team size.
The plots only use the first measures; the statistical analyses will test other measures
as well.
Here are some casual visual inspection results. It seems somewhat true that free-
riding is less for small teams than for large teams, especially for latter periods and for
large teams. Small teams seem free-ride more in the non-modular production than in
the modular production. Efficiency seems higher in the modular production. In the
non-modular production, small teams seem more efficient especially for latter periods.
It seems that spillover is significantly higher for large teams.
In the statistical analyses, I first used an ANOVA. Standard ANOVA assumes
independence, normality, and homoskedasticity of errors terms. The data do not
satisfy the last two. I still performed ANOVA on these data because Conover and
Iman (1980) suggest that ANOVA can still be performed the usual way after rank
transforming the dependent variables.
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Figure 3.2: Percentages of Free-riding, Spillover, and Efficiency Varying Modularity
and Team Size
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Dependent Variableijk = µ+ Team Sizei + Modularityj
+ Team Sizei ×Modularityj + εijk (3.1)
Here are the main results using the Tukey-Kramer test for pairwise comparisons
at the 5% significance level (please refer to Figure 3.3 for test statistics and critical
values):
Result III.8. There is significantly less free-riding for small teams than that in large
teams.
Result III.9. In the non-modular production, small teams are significantly more
efficient15.
Result III.10. There is significantly more spillover in the non-modular production.
Result III.11. There is significantly less free-riding in the modular production than
that in the non-modular production only for large teams.
Result III.12. Efficiency in the modular production is significantly higher than that
in the non-modular production for large and small teams16.
Result III.13. There is significantly more spillover for large teams.
The overall results are the following. Hypotheses III.1, III.3, III.4 are partly
rejected, and hypotheses III.2, III.5, III.6 and III.7 cannot be rejected. The test
cannot reject a result not mentioned in all hypotheses: there was a higher percentage
of spillover for large teams. To summarize, large teams were associated with a higher
free-riding level than small teams. Free-riding was more severe when large teams
15This is only true for the first measure of efficiency.
16This is only true for the first measure of efficiency.
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Figure 3.3: Tukey-Kramer Tests of Difference in Means
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work in the non-modular production. There was a higher percentage of spillover in
the non-modular production, especially for large teams. When efficiency is measured
as the percentage of profits made over maximum profits, small teams were more
efficient than large teams in the non-modular production and efficiency was higher in
the modular production irrespective of team size.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper reports experimental results on open contents, which are free to use,
reuse, and distribute.
Price (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary) often drives the allocation of resources.
However, it is sometimes difficult to measure the difficulty of a task, even less so
by a central authority. If price were used as a measure, it can only be a rather
imperfect signal. This experiment documents a case in which price was at times not
used to coordinate resources in open contents where production was decentralized.
Free-riding, measured as zero price to helpers, was prevalent in the experiment. Large
teams were associated with a higher free-riding level than small teams, and free-riding
was more severe when large teams work in a non-modular production environment.
Free-riding resulted in the removal of a signaling function of price for the difficulty
levels of tasks. However, this removal was not sufficient to lead to the catastrophic
outcome of zero payoff. In fact, for one measure of efficiency, small teams were more
efficient than large teams in the non-modular production and efficiency was higher in
the modular production irrespective of team size.
If the two team size levels here are a reasonable approximation to the team size
levels in a given firm, here are some implications for managers concerning efficiency:
if the production function is restricted to be non-modular, reduce the team size; with
no such restriction, always choose the modular production function.
This paper calls for more explanations about some effects of non-modularity
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(across different team sizes) that offset the dis-incentives mentioned in the man-
agement science research and sub-optimality in the computer science literature. We
have not directly investigated what prevented the catastrophic outcomes and whether
subjects use the contents instead of prices to (at least implicitly) signal the difficulty
levels of tasks. We also have not directly investigated whether and how open contents
facilitate learning. But the data showed that spillover was significantly higher in the
non-modular production. The exact mechanisms about how production costs can be
lowered due to spillover might offer a promising path for future research.
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CHAPTER IV
Using Uncensored Communication Channels to
Divert Spam Traffic
4.1 Introduction
We all receive spam; we all resent it. Justice Potter Stewart, were he alive, would
know it when he saw it. Nonetheless, it is hard to find a consensus definition of spam.
Some want to include all unsolicited commercial email; others include unsolicited
bulk email; others distinguish between deceptive, informative or malicious email. We
should not be surprised, then, that it is also hard to find systematic analyses of “the
spam problem”, when there are so many notions of what spam is.
Our goals are twofold. We want to identify a particular (but prevalent) subspecies
of spam, analyze its ecology, and propose a mechanism that may increase social
welfare substantially by modifying the flows of this type of spam. We also hope to
lay groundwork for systematic modeling of spam, and the consequent development of
solutions that are effective because they address systematic features of the problem.
We define spam as bulk, unsolicited, commercial email ; that is, effectively iden-
tical (but usually randomly disguised) messages sent unsolicited to large numbers of
recipients with the goal of inducing a willing, mutually-beneficial purchase by the re-
cipients. With this definition (we will call it “spam” for convenience, but it’s merely
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one subspecies) we rule out malicious bulk unsolicited email (e.g., email carrying a
virus payload); we rule out deceptive email (e.g., “phishing” messages that attempt
to trick recipients into revealing valuable personal information such as bank pass-
words); and we rule out email (though initially unsolicited) sent to a mailing list,
from which one could unsubscribe. What we rule out is not insignificant; we just
take our definition as a starting point and leave the study of other email problems
for future research. We do document that commercial spam is the most prevalent
form. And we have analyzed how some of our results change when the proportion of
malicious and deceptive email changes.
Defined as we have done, spam is an instance of a differently-named, well-known
phenomenon: advertising. Using the less-pejorative moniker “email advertising”
might give us a good start on a thoughtful, systematic consideration; certainly, it
might help us recognize that at least this type of spam is not per se evil or morally
deficient (though, as with any advertising, some population subgroups might conclude
that the products advertised might fail that group’s morality test). Nonetheless, we
will use “commercial spam” or just “spam” for short, because we relish the powerful
affective response the term receives, and the opportunity to puncture the pejorative
bubble it engenders.
To develop a systematic analysis of (non-deceptive, non-malicious) commercial
spam, we need grounding principles. We find that surprising insights follow from
adopting just two familiar, simple economic principles:
Revealed preference There is a non-trivial demand for the receipt of spam email.
Rational choice Spam purveyors will send spam messages to whomever, wherever,
whenever, as long as the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.
We expect that only the first principle will raise many eyebrows at first, but we find
that the second principle consistently has been half-ignored in most prior literature
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on “the spam problem”.
First, demand. Spam is not costless to generate or deliver, despite casual claims
to the contrary. It is true that replication and transport costs are extremely low,
compared to non-digital advertising channels. But there are a number of other costs:
marketing and contracting costs with advertisers, content creation costs, content dis-
guising costs (to get past technological filters), distribution technology costs (most
spam is now sent out by virus-created spambots running on many machines not owned
by the spam provider; these botnets need to be continuously regenerated, which re-
quires developing new viruses to distribute, among other things). There may also be
the cost of expected legal penalties. Given the non-zero costs of providing a spamming
service, and with our scope limited to just commercial spam, from which the benefit
to the sender is the inducement of willing purchases by recipients, we must conclude
the following: by revealed preference, there is a non-trivial demand for the receipt
of spam email. Some consenting adults must be purchasing enough Rolex knock-offs
and counterfeit products to pay the spammer’s costs.
While the revealed demand could encompass some spurious demand induced by
malicious or deceptive ads (e.g., for fake Viagra), some portion of the revealed demand
is likely to be real. Few buyers will believe that a $50 Rolex is authentic.1 In any
case, we do not rule out spurious demand. Rather, we simply analyze the potential of
our proposed mechanism to reduce non-spurious demand for bulk email advertising.
We do not claim that this mechanism is likely to also eliminate deceptive ads from
the inbox.
To motivate and clarify our scope, we present some informal evidence. Such ev-
idence is consistent with our claim that there is non-trivial demand for much spam:
Cranor and LaMacchia (1998) show that the largest fraction of spam content is com-
1There may be a deeper issue for some misleading ads: from a neutral social welfare perspective
it may not be appropriate to treat some misled demand as spurious. For example, inert imitation
Viagra may provide desirable (placebo) effects simply because people think it works.
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mercial advertising for products hard to find through other advertising channels.
Sophos (2005) finds that this pattern continues; for example, in 2005 medication
spam constitutes around 40% of all spam, and adult content for another 10-20%.
Evett (2006) estimates that product spam constitutes around 25% of all spam, and
adult content for another 19%.2 We expect there will always be significant demand
for “push” advertising in addition to “pull” (search-based) advertising.34
Recognizing that some recipients want to read spam, while many others evidently
do not, we immediately see that one opportunity for social welfare improvement is to
find a way to match commercial spam to those who want it, and not to those who do
not. The latter email readers would benefit, and spam senders would also benefit by
not incurring the costs of sending to people who will not purchase.
As a corollary, we expect the willing recipients of commercial spam to benefit as
well: if spammers can find a way to send to those who are interested in receiving the
advertisements, then they can reduce their costs and increase the information content
and quality in their ads, to the benefit of those who want the commercial information.
Consider: Yellow Pages are a fairly successful bulk advertising medium because the
ads are generally viewed only by those who want to see them, and the advertisers
have the incentive to make the ads clear and informative, giving the viewers the
information they desire. Spammers in contrast incur substantial costs to disguise
the information in their ads so that filters cannot easily remove the ads from the
email stream. But then the readers who do want the information so they can make
2Evett (2006) compiles his statistics from sources that include Google, Brightmail, Jupiter Re-
search, eMarketer, Gartner, MailShell, Harris Interactive, and Ferris Research.
3This is evidenced by the multiple media for advertising that co-exist in equilibrium (Yellow
Pages, local newspapers, billboards, broadcast TV and radio ads, bulk unsolicited commercial surface
mail ads, etc.). Many products using commercial spam advertising do not want a durable, public
presence. If they are moving their web sites to new domains frequently, they need a communication
channel through which to disseminate each new, temporary location. Indeed, we observe cases in
which the links for some domains selling medications expired in Google’s index well before Google
got a chance to renew the links. For example, MessageLabs (2005) shows that about 30% of spam
domains expire within 24 hours.
4Hann et al. (2008), in modeling avoidance behavior by marketing recipients, also model spam
as advertising for which there is non-zero demand.
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a purchase are confronted with uninformative, low-value ads.
The second principle we offer as a foundation for systematic analysis of the spam
ecology is that spammers are for the most part rational businesspeople, and they
will send ads when the expected benefit to them exceeds the expected cost. What
insight do we obtain from this unsurprising observation?5 We answer, first, indirectly:
most other authors addressing spam have focused on proposals to raise the cost of
spamming as a way of reducing the amount of spam produced. This approach is
principled, but incomplete. An equivalent reduction in the benefits of spamming
(e.g., by inducing those who want spam to read it in a different channel) should
have the same (qualitative) incentive effect. If spam were flood waters, the existing
solutions are in the spirit of building stronger levees to raise the river banks, instead
of diverting the flood waters using a floodway. Both might properly belong in an
effective flood management policy.
We build on these two principles to construct a model for commercial spam that
includes advertisers, spam service providers, email service providers, and mail re-
cipients who have heterogeneous tastes for receiving spam.6 See Figure 4.1. We
then introduce a simple but novel mechanism motivated by the two principles above:
an uncensored (open) communication channel through which spam will be accepted
without filtering or other attempts to block. Such a channel could be as simple as a
standardized mail client folder that would accept all appropriately labeled messages.7
See Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Our conjecture is that if well-designed, then under some
circumstances the introduction of an uncensored channel could result in substantial
5We know, of course, that not every decision, in every circumstance, satisfies a test for decision-
theoretic rationality. We only require that costly business decisions in general follow from reasonable
comparisons of benefits to costs.
6In our current model we focus on the preferences and behaviors of recipients, spammers, and
advertisers. We use a reduced-form, non-adaptive representation for email service providers.
7On a practical level, the sender chooses whether to send to the censored or the open channel (or
both). When sending to the open channel, the sender does not disguise content, and adds a tag that
indicates the message should be delivered to the open channel. If sending to the censored channel,
the sender does not tag the message, and in fact may expend some effort to disguise the content.
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self-segregation by spammers, with email advertisements mostly targeted at the open
channel, and much less at the traditional (censored) channel. See Figure 4.4.
There should be little dispute that if users could implicitly opt-in for commercial
spam by creating an uncensored folder, the spammers would send mail to that channel.
But why would they stop sending (or at least send less) to the censored channel? Our
hypothesis is that if enough of the latent demand for purchasing spam-advertised
products is reached through the uncensored channel, then the remaining commercial
benefits obtainable from also spamming the censored channel may fall sufficiently low
that they no longer justify the incremental costs.8 In our formal model below we
show one set of conditions sufficient to guarantee this result.
There is another reason for spammers to keep sending to the traditional censored
channel: persuasion. We are assuming that recipients know if they want to periodi-
cally purchase based on spam advertisements, and thus can make an ex ante rational
choice about which channel to read. This situation is known in the literature as in-
formative advertising9: consumers know they want information (price, location, etc.)
about particular products, and seek out informative advertising to obtain the infor-
mation they need. But there is another category: persuasive advertising, intended
to convince consumers to buy products they previously did not realize they wanted.
Since these ads are aimed at consumers who might generally opt out of the open chan-
nel, it would do little good to send them to the open channel (which these previously
uninterested customers shun), so the persuasive advertiser will generally go to where
the unpersuaded are (the censored channel). Persuasion, however, comes at the cost
of being filtered more easily because of the less disguised content. If the open channel
8One reason the benefits in the censored channel might drop is that if users looking for unsolicited
ads turn first to the better organized and more informative open channel, the level of demand for
products advertised with less informative messages in the open channel may fall sufficiently that the
expense of sending to the censored channel — and spending to get around the filters — is no longer
worthwhile.
9See especially the section under the sub-heading “Is advertising used to inform or persuade?”
on p. 28 of Taylor (1934).
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Figure 4.1: Stakeholders In An E-Mail Ecosystem.
Figure 4.2: An Hypothetical Open Channel.
Figure 4.3: An Hypothetical Tag.
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Figure 4.4: Separating The Demand For And Supply Of Bulk Unsolicited Commercial
Advertising.
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does not make persuasion in the censored channel easier than when there is only the
censored channel, the omission of persuasive advertising is not necessary fatal (see
discussions right before Proposition IV.6).
Recall also that if spammers do choose to target the open channel, then we ex-
pect that they will also stop dissipating resources on unproductive efforts to disguise
the informative content of their messages. Then those who wish to receive email ad-
vertisements will benefit from the higher quality (informativeness). This increase in
informativeness, in turn, likely would induce a larger number of consumers to want
to receive commercial spam.
We construct a model so that we may formally identify conditions under which
the conjectures above hold true (and conditions under which they do not). Our
main results are to characterize the degree to which spam will be shifted to the open
channel, and to demonstrate that under reasonable assumptions all parties benefit
from the introduction of an open channel, so that it constitutes a Pareto improvement.
4.2 Prior approaches to spam
To date, most research focuses on reducing spam generally, usually through policy,
technical or market mechanisms that raise the cost of sending spam. Before we detail
our model of a mechanism that diverts spam to those who want it, and away from
those who don’t, we review other approaches.
4.2.1 Technological
Technological solutions have gained some partial success but the results are far
from satisfactory even though they have been implemented for some time. The
proposals include rule-based, Bayesian, and community (“collaborative”) filtering,
disposable identities using extended email addresses (Bleichenbacher et al., 1998),
DomainKeys Identified Mail (Perez , 2005), Sender ID or Sender Policy Framework
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(Crocker , 2006)10, challenge-response (Dwork and Naor , 1993; Laurie and Clayton,
2004), whitelists, and blacklists. See Cranor and LaMacchia (1998) for an overview
of these ideas (though not of course of the more recent specific proposals).
There is a fundamental problem with technological systems: they typically rely
on the cost to spammers of devising technological workarounds. If the cost is high
enough, the net benefit of spamming will be insufficient and the quantity of success-
ful (delivered) spam will fall. However, the costs of technological workarounds fall
rapidly, as technology becomes exponentially cheaper and as algorithmic solutions to
hard computational problems rapidly improve. Thus, as the workaround cost falls,
the technological barrier becomes less effective and spam delivered increases. This
fundamental cost dynamic creates a need for ongoing investment to create improved
anti-spam technologies. While an “arms race” may not be the first-best solution, we
have not seen feasible methods to avoid this cycle, given the inevitable and rapid
decline in technology costs. Certainly, though some of the cost has been shifted to
ISPs and mail service providers, it appears that the social cost of spam has been
increasing, not decreasing, despite the proliferation of technological fixes.
4.2.2 Legal
Legal rules are another approach to spam reduction. The U.S. CAN-SPAM act
required a formal recommendation from the Federal Trade Commission regarding the
establishment of a do-not-spam registry similar in the spirit of the do-not-call and do-
not-fax registries created pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.
Although The FTC recommended against the creation of the list, other CAN-SPAM
rules took effect 1 January 2004. However, legal solutions alone are, and likely will
remain incomplete. First, to avoid prohibiting desirable email communications, legal
rules generally include safe harbor provisions guaranteeing the permissibility of email
10As of now, spam-sending domains are ironically the biggest users of SPF tags (MXLogic, 2005)
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exhibiting certain characteristics. It is generally difficult or impossible to prevent
spammers from composing their messages so that they exhibit these characteristics,
thus creating a safe harbor for a large and probably growing quantity of spam. Second,
legal jurisdiction over spam-distributing organizations is a crucial problem: spammers
can easily change their locations to other countries.
4.2.3 Markets
Some proposals based on economic incentives have been gaining attention. These
share an important feature with our approach to the problem: they typically are
based on a presumption that users have heterogeneous values for receiving various
email messages.
In an experimental investigation of email stamps as a price for obtaining a recip-
ient’s attention, Kraut et al. (2005) found that charging causes senders to be more
selective and to send fewer messages. This method, however, requires non-spammers
to pay a price as well. van Zandt (2004) examines the design of an optimal tax
that minimizes exploitation of attention through information overload. Various email
stamp systems have been or are about to be implemented.11 Loder et al. (2006) pro-
pose an attention-bond mechanism in which a sender deposits a monetary bond to a
third-party agent, to be released only if the receiver tells the agent to do so. Both
Loder et al. (2006) and we recognize hetereogeneous valuations of mail messages; they
provide an incentive that increases spammer costs, while we provide an incentive that
reduces spammer benefits.
Payment systems require substantial infrastructure for full implementation. The
11Two of the world’s largest providers of e-mail accounts, America Online and Yahoo!, announced
in early 2006 that they would give preferential treatment to messages from companies paying from
1/4 of a cent to a penny each. An email stamp system was already implemented in Korea in 2003.
Daum Corporation, the largest portal in Korea, charges about 0.8 cents to the senders who send
more than 1000 messages per day. Fees scale downwards if senders are ranked lower than the biggest
senders or more users rate the email as useful. Data cited by Kraut et al. (2005) indicate that spam
was reduced by about 40% from its peak in a half-year period around the implementation.
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infrastructure necessary for widespread micropayment is lacking, and for successful
adoption into a service exhibiting network effects, such as email, it is likely necessary
that there be early widespread, not incremental, adoption, which is difficult to socially
engineer. Also, there is a norm of free email service. Legitimate senders may resist
paying for outgoing email more strenuously than is strictly justified if they took into
account the system benefits to their recipients.
4.3 Theory
In our brief review of other approaches to spam we highlighted one common fea-
ture: they are generally based on raising the costs of spamming, not on reducing the
benefits. In addition, technological and legal methods (and some market methods,
but less so) implicitly assume that certain mail (or mail senders) are uniformly un-
desirable; that is, they ignore heterogeneity in recipient preferences. In this section
we present a model of the two-sided market for commercial spam, in which product
sellers pay spammers to deliver advertisements to email recipients, some of whom in
turn willingly choose to purchase the advertised products.12 We then analyze the
effect of introducing an open (i.e., uncensored) channel. The open channel approach
is designed to lower the benefits to spammers of sending mail to all recipients, and
works only and precisely because recipient preferences are heterogeneous: viz., some
recipients want to receive email advertisements.
4.3.1 Mail Types
Mail types coincide with senders’ types. Such types are defined by two attributes:
mass or targeted mail, and solicited or unsolicited.
The first attribute is mainly a cost attribute of sending. The content creation cost
12The email market is a typical problem of two-sided markets (e.g., Rochet and Tirole (2003),
Parker and Alstyne (2005)), which is closely related to the chicken-and-egg problem. Roughly
speaking, the number of senders affects the number of recipients, and vice versa.
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per copy of mass mail is much lower than that of targeted mail.13 14 Also, because of
information asymmetry of each recipient’s preference for spam, by definition, mass-
mail senders’ best strategy is to randomize recipients’ addresses.
The second attribute is mainly a cost attribute of blocking. As mail is consid-
ered solicited for our purpose, even if it is initially unsolicited, if one could easily
unsubscribe (block) oneself from such mailing lists permanently.
In all, we identify four types of mail, and provide examples:
Unsolicited mass: Viagra and erotic content advertisements.
Unsolicited targeted: Personalized advertisements based on purchase history ob-
tained elsewhere.
Solicited mass: Advertisements from conventional booksellers, non-profit fundrais-
ers, and other legal and less socially objectionable purveyors.
Solicited targeted: Personal correspondence.
Unsolicited mass mail constitutes the bulk of the unwanted email for most individuals.
We therefore simplify our analysis using this convenient assumption:
Assumption IV.1. Mail Segregation: Mass-mail senders send only unsolicited mail,
and targeted-mail senders send only solicited mail.
Henceforth, when the context is clear, we refer to unsolicited mass mail senders as
senders, and the mail they send simply as mail.
13We do not require that it is possible to identify whether a message is mass mail or targeted mail.
It is easy to fool general purpose filters, and the recipient often will not know until after incurring
the cost of viewing the message.
14There has been substantial debate about whether spamming is inevitable because the incremen-
tal cost of a spam message is essentially zero. It is clear to us that the cost is not zero: costs of
disguising, costs of obtaining valid email addresses, costs of legal proceedings, and bandwidth costs
all likely increase with the number of spam messages sent. If the spammer is using a spambot farm
of compromised machines to provide “free” processing and bandwidth, there will be costs of writing
the viruses that carry the spambot payloads: the more spam messages to send, the more machines
need to be compromised. See Hann et al. (2006) for recent estimates of the non-zero incremental
costs of spamming.
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4.3.2 The Recipients’ Problem
Assume that for unsolicited mass mail, some individuals want to receive a fraction
1 − ε. The value ε ∈ [0, 1] increases if there are more undesirable properties with
unsolicited mass mail such as phishing and malicious content. We assume there are
two types of recipient: “high” and “low”. Only high-types desire unsolicited mass
mail (that is, have some demand for the goods advertised in such mail). We define a
variable to indicate demand for unsolicited mail: wr : {wr̄ = 1, wr = 0}. There is a
large number of high-type (r̄) recipients indexed by r̄ on the interval [0, 1] according
to a probability distribution ψr̄. The corresponding index for low-type recipients is
r distributed according to ψr. Recipient types are exogenous. We assume recipients of
a given type have the same budget for spending on advertised goods, and normalize
this amount to wr. They buy goods from ads in the channel that offer the lower
average price, where pj is the average price offered by ads in channel j. We later model
how recipients respond to an advertisement based on how informative or transparent it
is. Whether mail (desired or undesired) is received depends on the filtering technology
employed by the email service provider. We model this below, but for now simply
refer to mail that gets through as “unfiltered” and mail that does not as “filtered”.
In the censored channel, filtering technology is designed to block unsolicited mass
mail, but it does so imperfectly. Each sender knows that the filter has a strength of
f c ∈ [1,∞) for unsolicited mass-mail. The filter strength is simply the inverse of the
fraction of mail that gets through the filter. By definition there is no filtering in the
open channel, f o = 1.
Sender s can make an effort to disguise its content to reduce the filter’s success
rate. We let sender s choose a transparency level, tjs ∈ [ 1fj , 1], for mail sent to
channel j, where tjs is a multiplicative factor adjusting the filter strength. If t
j
s = 1,
the mail is transparent with no disguise at all and the effective filter strength is the
technological strength f j. If tjs = 1/f
j, the effective filter strength is one, which is to
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say, all content passes through unfiltered. Disguising is costly; there is no effort made
to disguise content in the open channel.15
Denote N jr as the volume of mail sent to recipient r in channel j. Essentially, it is
the mail sent averaged across all recipients in j. Rjr̄ is the number of high-types using
channel j; Rj is the total number of recipients who choose to use channel j. Then





tj is the weighted average of transparency levels in channel j.
We define κjr = 1 if recipient r uses channel j, zero otherwise. To build a tractable
model, we make another assumption to rule out the unlikely scenario that no one is
using the existing email channel:
Assumption IV.2. Channel Essentiality: The censored channel is essential so
that every recipient uses it. That is, κcr = 1.
Let us now state the recipient’s problem formally. Given other variables, recipient




r) ≡ Ur(vgr (κor), vIr (κor), vIIr (κor)) (4.1)
Ur is increasing in the first argument, and decreasing for the rest. The first argument
is the volume of advertised goods consumed, which is given by total spending divided
by price (paid to the advertiser indexed by a) in the channel with the lower price








15By definition of the lower bound of tjs, t
o
s = 1 because f
o = 1 implies that the upper and lower
bounds coincide.
16We simplified the problem from an equivalent but more explicit formulation: Recipient r chooses




























which is zero for low-type recipients since wr = 0.








When a recipient is a high type (wr = 1), this is the fraction ε of unsolicited mail
the high type does not want to receive (summed across the channels to which she
subscribes). For a low type, this is all unsolicited mail received.









which is zero for low-type recipients since wr = 0. There is no filtering in the open
channel, so for high types this is the fraction of desirable unsolicited mail (1− ε) that
is filtered out of the censored channel.
4.3.3 The Senders’ Problem
There is a large number of senders indexed by s on the interval [0, 1] according to



















s are the email volumes in the open and censored
channels. tcs is the transparency of the mail sent to the censored channel. We assume:





= cos > 0
17.
Note that ccs and c
o
s are constants.
17Rather than having a zero marginal sending cost (∂Cs/∂N js ) as commonly asserted, spammers
incur cost to renew technologies, which depreciate quickly, to generate spam. For example, zombies
(i.e., home computers hijacked by crackers) are consistently destroyed by anti-virus software, so
spammers must continuously develop and distribute new viruses to capture new (temporary) zom-
bies. Zombies are responsible for relaying more than 60% of the world’s spam (Sophos, 2005). One
could have used a step function to model the cost function but a smooth function would approximate
a step function when the number of zombies increases.
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• Negative transparency (positive disguise) cost: ∂Cs
∂tcs
< 0
On the revenue side, senders are price takers. Advertisers pay them for solici-
tations. Let pjs be the advertising charge per disguised email reaching the users in
channel j18,19.





















− cosN os − ccsN cs − d(tcs) (4.5)
s.t. tcs ∈ [
1
f c
, 1], N os , N
c
s ≥ 0 (4.6)
Next we state the solutions to the above maximization problem:
Result IV.3. The best responses of sender s are:
N os > 0 ⇐⇒ pos ≥ cos (4.7)





















where ECs,Ncs and ECs,tcs are elasticities.
Proof. See Appendix C.
18In practice, there is a volume discount (that might, for instance, be due to diminishing likelihood
to respond). For instance, Send-Safe is a service spammers offer to advertisers. One pricing scheme




c ) when an advertiser pays for 0.4 million
credits. The price drops monotonically to US$10 per 1 million credits when an advertiser pays for
300 million credits. This pricing scheme is available at http://www.send-safe.com/send-safe.html,
accessed 29 March 2009 (though the page appears to have last been updated in 2006).
19Whether the price is charged per delivery or per click does not affect the main results of the
model, it is largely a normalization issue.
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the marginal revenue of channel j is strictly less than the marginal cost, sender s
does not send any to channel j. Else, sender s makes some economic profit because
in channel j the marginal revenue is weakly greater than the marginal cost in a given






c ) in the censored channel by the same
amount, a sender could either adjust N cs or t
c





4.3.4 The Advertisers’ Problem
There is a large number of advertisers indexed by a on the interval [0, 1] according
to a probability distribution ψa. Advertiser a’s total cost derives from the production
of goods sold, and from the advertising for them.
Let θj be the probability that an advertisement in channel j leads to a purchase,
and nja is the number of messages delivered on behalf of advertiser a (whereas N
j
a is the







jnja, exhibits constant-returns-to-scale technology. ca is the constant marginal
production cost. θj = θ(tja,
Rjr̄
Rj
), where tja is the transparency level of email in channel




is the ratio of high-type recipients in channel











a, is linear. Recall that p
j
s is the marginal advertising
charge in channel j that is paid to senders.
For each pjs paid, advertiser a collects expected sales revenue equal to the price
paid by ad recipients cum consumers, pja, times the probability of making a sale in
channel j, θj.



















s.t. nja ≥ 0 (4.11)
Result IV.4. The best responses of advertiser a are:
nca > 0 ⇐⇒ θcca + pcs ≤ θcpca (4.12)
noa > 0 ⇐⇒ θoca + pos ≤ θopoa (4.13)
Proof. See Appendix D.
This result implies that the volume requested should be zero in both channels if
the marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit in each channel, and that the volume
requested in channel j should be strictly positive when the marginal markup is posi-
tive. The marginal markup is the marginal sale price (pja) minus the marginal cost of




) and marginal production cost (ca).
4.3.5 Equilibrium
4.3.5.1 Competitive Equilibrium
By assuming atomistic, price-taking recipients, advertisers and spam senders (which
can be justified for the latter two by an assumption of free entry), we have the condi-
tions for a competitive equilibrium. Using a hat symbol to denote equilibrium values,
a competitive equilibrium by definition satisfies the following:















































































a) = 0 (4.19)
















By homogeneity, integrating over all agents of the same type gives a commonly







k∈[0,1] h(k)dk = ẑ
j
k,where h is the probability distribution function of ẑ
j). In this
sense, we justify the use of representative agents for convenience. The values they
have chosen are simply the total consumed by the same type of agents in the economy.
The following expression states that the volume of goods consumed by all recip-
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Advertising mail volume in Opt-in is a best response?
Open channel Censored channel High types Low types
Zero Zero Yes and No Yes and No
Zero Positive Yes and No Yes and No
Positive Zero Yes No
Positive Positive Yes and/or No No
Table 4.1: The Best Responses of Recipients
ients (and the representative high and low type recipients) is equal to the response






















We first show the following best responses of the recipients. Note in particular
that high-type recipients, and only they, will use the open channel if the advertising
mail volume sent to the open channel is strictly positive and that sent to the censored
channel equals zero.
Result IV.5. If the utility increase with the increase in goods purchased at least
offsets the utility decrease with the increase in Type I errors, the best responses of
the recipients are listed in Table 4.1.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The first two rows of Table 4.1 are not very interesting (though necessary to
calculate the equilibrium): if no mail is sent to the open channel, it is a matter of
indifference to both types of use whether they subscribe to that channel or not. When
there is open channel mail, it is not surprising that low-type recipients do not use the
open channel because each of the arguments in their utility function can only move
in the undesirable directions if they opt-in. For the high-type recipients, it is not
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immediately clear that they will opt-in for sure because the utility increase due to
the increased volume of goods consumed could be offset by the utility decrease due
to the increase in Type I and II errors20.
We now show the only symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium besides the
status quo21. The status quo in this simultaneous game is a trivial one, which falls
into the class of chicken-and-egg problems typical in two-sided markets: no agents use
the open channel because no other agents use it. The remaining pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium is our main result: the open channel diminishes the volume of unsolicited
mass mail in the censored channel to zero, and only high-type recipients use the open
channel.
The intuition is simple. Senders’ actions can be grouped into four cases: positive
or zero volume in each channel. There can be no best response when there is zero
volume in each channel because the profit is undefined due to infinite sales prices.
If mail is only sent to the censored channel and no recipients opt in for the open
channel, this scenario is identical to the status quo. When there is positive volume in
each channel, the senders are wasting resources on mail sent to the censored channel
because sales could have been made in the open channel as well but with less costs.
The only case left is for mail to be sent only to the open channel, which is optimal
for the senders when the high types have opted in for the open channel and when the
marginal revenue generated is greater than the marginal cost for the senders. Now
when senders send only to the open channel, we know from Result IV.5 that the best
response for the high types is to opt-in but not for the low-types.
One may wonder if this representative agents model captures the case when every
20The readers might worry that a lemon market would emerge where only undesirable email is
present in the open channel. One could extend the model to lessen the effects of the lemon problem.
For example, one could assume that recipients using the open channel are more cautious. Or there
could be messages in the open channel that dissuade (e.g a spammer selling fake Viagra might tell
people to not to respond to certain messages that would link to sites that steal one’s credit card
information.)
21The symmetry here refers to same parameters of agents within each type (recipients, senders,
and advertisers), which is subsumed in our representative agent modeling.
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sender sends only to the open channel, will some advertiser ã benefits from deviating
to send some to the censored channel? The answer is no for agents with homogeneous
costs because ã′s response rate can’t increase.22 Intuitively, for each mail message ã
sends to the censored channel, another sender can always undercut the price adver-
tised in ã′s message by sending an identical message to the open channel with a lower
price. The second price is lower because there is no need to disguise the message and
the sending cost is cheaper in the open channel. Will the recipients bother to search
for the undercutting message in the open channel whenever they see a message, in
the censored channel, advertising goods that interest them? Very possibly because
the marginal costs of search is very low: the recipients can cut and paste the first
message into the search box in the open channel to find an exact match there with a
lower price. One could of course argue that the fixed costs of such search skills are
high because of learning needed.
Proposition IV.6. Nash: Besides the status quo, the only symmetric pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium is: (κ̂or̄ = 1, κ̂
o
r = 0; N̂
o
s > 0, N̂
c
s → 0, t̂c ≤ 1; n̂oa > 0, n̂ca → 0),






c and θ̂op̂oa = θ̂
oca + c
o











Proof. See Appendix F.
4.3.6 Welfare
When the sales price in all transactions is lowered, the volume of goods sold
increases given a fixed expenditure. Equation (4.22) tells us it could mean that the
response rate, the mail volume or both has increased. It could also mean that the
22For recipients to buy from both channels (justifying nca, n
o
ã > 0), p
o
a has to be the same as
pcã, which is a contradiction. The reason is that by Results IV.3 and IV.4, and the zero profit
conditions, nca, n
o
a > 0 implies that p̂
c






and p̂oa = ca +
cos
θ̂o
. By cost homogeneity,
cã = ca. If poa = p
c
ã, we must have θ
c > θo because ccst̂
c
sf
c > cos. θ








response rate becomes so high that the mail volume decreases. Denote the status quo
variables when the open channel is absent using ∞ as a superscript23, we show the
latter:
Proposition IV.7. Mail Volume: For the status quo and the other Nash equilib-
rium in Proposition IV.6,
∑
j




















c,∞ + p̂c,∞s ), (4.24)
where p̂c,∞s = c
c
st̂
c,∞f c > p̂os = c
o
s.
Proof. See Appendix G.
Expression (4.23) states that the mail volume received by all recipients is lower
than that in the status quo if and only if the total marginal cost per mail received (i.e.,
the sum of marginal costs of production (caθ̂
o) and advertising (p̂os) per mail received)
is higher than the status quo value (caθ̂
c,∞ + p̂c,∞s ). For the mail volume to decrease
after the implementation of the open channel, the new response rate has to be so high
that the increase in the marginal cost of production per mail received (caθ̂
o−caθ̂c,∞) is




> 1, (4.24) implies (4.23). When each recipient receives less, the total
received is also less (the converse is not true). It is scaled by R
Rr̄
because the com-
parison now is between the total marginal costs per mail received by the high-type
recipients (trivially the low-type recipients receive less because there is no unsolicited
mass mail in the only channel they opted in). In the status quo, for every R
Rr̄
mail
23When the open channel is absent, we interpret it as fo → ∞. When such filter strength is
infinitely strong, it is as if there is no such channel for any practical use.
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Figure 4.5: Mail Volume Changes Compared to the Status Quo.
received by all recipients, only one is received by the high-type recipients, that is why
the corresponding total marginal cost is inflated by R
Rr̄
.
In the following proposition, we prove that in the non status quo Nash equilibrium
described in Proposition IV.6, each recipient’s utility has not decreased after the roll-
out of the open channel because the utility associated with goods does not decrease,
and the dis-utilities associated with Type II errors do not increase. Type I errors
will not increase for high-type recipients if Proposition IV.7 holds or ε = 0. The
latter condition (ε = 0) is a type of free disposal of unsolicited mass mail in the open
channel, which will depend on clutter or handling costs (the cost of disposal itself is
vanishingly close to zero). This condition is likely to hold (approximately) if there is
a good search engine within the open channel, and if sellers who no longer need to
disguise their ads to get past filters will provide information helpful for sorting and
filtering ads. Instead of ε = 0, we also prove the case in which we require a lower
unsolicited mass mail volume than in the status quo.
The structure of the proof is simple. The welfare of the unsolicited mass-mail
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senders and advertisers will be unchanged because they make zero profit with and
without the open channel. The welfare of the recipients could differ. To compare the
welfare change for a given recipient when there is an open channel, we compare his
or her utility after and before the roll-out of the open channel: Ûr − limfo→∞ Ûr.
Proposition IV.8. Welfare: If Proposition IV.6 holds and either Proposition
IV.7 holds or ε = 0, the welfare of the advertisers, unsolicited mass-mail senders
and all recipients will be weakly increased when there is an open channel.
Proof. See Appendix H.
4.4 Discussion
We emphasize that our proposal is a starting point. Many issues beyond the scope
of this analysis need further investigation. We discuss a few here.
It may seem that an open channel is already implemented by the common mail
client spam folder. However, a client spam folder is usually the last stage of multi-
stage filtering. Most email service providers block some traffic altogether, and only
mail that makes it through the first (or first n− 1) filter(s) are candidates for quar-
antine in a user spam folder. Thus, to get to that channel, senders already incurred
disguise costs.
We mentioned at the beginning that an open channel could be implemented at
low cost. Any email service provider could immediately, at minimal cost, offer to let
all mail to certain clients pass through with a tag in a header (or even pre-pended to
the subject field) that would allow immediate and complete channeling to a separate
mailbox; when the email service provider itself provides the mail client (as do online
email providers like Gmail and Yahoo!) the open channel inbox could be provided for
users that wanted. What is less clear is whether incremental implementation would
be successful at drawing senders and readers of unsolicited commercial email into
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the open channel, or whether widespread, coordinated adoption would be necessary.
There are many potential reasons for an email service provider to not implement
an open channel currently. Being a multi-product firm, not using the open channel
does not imply that adding the open channel will decrease the profit of their email
division. However, it might not be implemented simply because it reduces profit in
other divisions (such as Google web search that facilitates pull versus the mainly push
technology in the open channel).
Would the open channel be flooded with so much more mail — since the cost
of sending ads would be lower — that those who want to see ads will incur costs
so high to find desired ads that they abandon using the open channel? This is a
complicated question, and one largely beyond the scope of this paper. There are
good reasons we think this may not happen, however. Since advertisers no longer
need to disguise their messages to get into the inbox, they need to only send one
message rather than many to guarantee delivery. Further, the advantages of having
many more or less identical messages in the inbox may be reduced if recipients can
easily find the messages they want and use indexing and finding services to sort
through them. Another possibility is the implementation of an expiration feature
to the open channel inbox: any messages beyond an expire date are automatically
deleted, to reduce clutter. Of course, advertisers will still want to compete with each
other for attention, and it is possible they will try to do so by proliferating messages in
the open channel. The result on balance cannot be predicted without a more detailed
model, and, most likely, some empirical evidence.
We have largely ignored what we call persuasive advertising, namely, advertis-
ing that tries to persuade people who did not know that they wanted to purchase
anything. These recipients in general will not opt-in to the open channel, and so
spammers may still try to reach them through the censored channel. Our conjecture
is that if enough demand is shifted to the open channel, and especially if prices for
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goods advertised there fall due to the lower marketing costs, that demand in the cen-
sored channel for goods sold by persuasive spammers may fall enough to discourage
this type of advertising, but we have not formally analyzed this. However, if the open
channel does reduce the number of ads, the impact on sales of the ads in the censored
channel will probably increase, and the open channel will thus make persuasion in
the censored channel easier. But we have already argued that the persuaders could
face a lower cost competitor in the open channel, which the customers buy from if
the search cost to find this competitor is low enough. In other words, the persuaders
convince the customers to buy the goods, but the price convinces the customers where
to buy the good.
4.5 Conclusions
Technical filters and legal rules raise the cost of delivering spam to readers. Costs
are borne by spammers (who must develop ever-changing techniques for avoiding
filters, etc.), but also by recipients, who spend time doing the difficult filtering and
reviewing that cannot be automated, and paying higher costs for goods to cover the
marketing expenses. On the other hand, an equivalent reduction in the benefits of
spamming (e.g. by moving out spam demanders) should have the same incentive
effect. More generally, methods that channel communications more directly to those
who want them would lower costs on both sides and be welfare improving.
We formalized this intuition and explored sufficient conditions for all email recip-
ients to be better off with the introduction of an open channel. We show that under
these conditions only recipients wanting unsolicited commercial advertisements will
use the open channel, and they will benefit from less disguised messages and lower
sales prices. In addition, for all recipients the dissatisfaction associated with both
undesirable mail received and desirable mail filtered out decreases.
We do not claim that our idea would provide a complete solution to the current
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spam problem, but of course, no other known and practical methods provide a com-
plete solution either. We do offer a novel new tool that may contribute to a reduction
in the flow of spam, and at the same time give advertisers a reason to increase the
informative content and quality of their ads, to the benefit of those who do want to
buy goods. Further, if we can tempt a substantial number of consumers who want
to purchase spam-advertised products into a separate email channel, the purchasing
value remaining in the traditional, filtered, or censored channel may drop sufficiently
to discourage spammers from using that increasingly unproductive channel.
The important insight we offer, which likely will lead to other, spam-reducing
techniques, is to recognize that there is not just a supply curve but also a demand
curve for spam. We model the incentives, within the ecosystem of existing spam
solutions, to induce both suppliers and demanders to move out of the current censored
channel and into the open channel. If customers who want to purchase will benefit
from more informative ads in a separate channel, then spam advertisers will benefit
from focusing their advertising spending on that channel. This should not be a very
controversial idea, but it is, we believe, an idea that has been largely missing from
the debate.
There is another illuminating economic perspective on our work: spam is funda-
mentally a problem that arises when disposal is not free. We know from the First
Fundamental Welfare Theorem that unregulated free markets are generally Pareto ef-
ficient, but that result requires free disposal. Spam is not free to dispose: it requires
time to open and consider. Some types of spam are malicious and may actually cause
harm to one’s data files or operating system before we can dispose of it.
Our proposal recreates a free market — the open channel — for those who do not
want to dispose of spam. It differs from other free-market solutions (e.g. email stamps
and bonds for email spam, and Google’s AdWords for web spam): The open channel
gives recipients the right to receive spam; it removes the right of the email service
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providers to decide whether the recipients should receive spam. (More generally, the
recipients’ right to choose the level of censorship is one of the many other possible
property right reassignments in the email ecosystem that have been largely unexplored
in the literature.) Also, we provide those for whom the disposal costs are sufficiently
high (not free) the choice to opt out and participate only in the censored channel.
Meanwhile, senders (and spam demanders) do not internalize the disposal costs of
uninterested recipients, but the senders nonetheless choose to send less to the censored
channel because the average propensity to buy falls as spam demanders move to the
open channel.
An open advertising channel is possible at low cost, and it is conceivable that it
would make email users at least weakly better off (no worse off) than the status quo.
At the very least, this mechanism is fully reversible. If well-designed, an incentive-
compatible advertising channel that harnesses the simultaneous forces of demand and




I studied two economic responses to the challenges of copyright infringements and
spam brought about by the birth of the Internet.
I used a tort model to study the inclusion of value-adding vendors who do not need
to pay the innovators for the production of open contents. I modeled after the SCO-
Linux controversy to include an agent who receives a positive expected payment in
intellectual property lawsuits but it is hard for other agents to contract with this agent
ex ante. I then analyzed how the litigation between this agent, vendors, innovators
and users affects care levels and quantities distributed. The main contributions here
are the derivation of some necessary conditions for efficiency and sufficient conditions
for inefficiency in the context of open contents. In addition, I derived some necessary
conditions for the optimal licensing rules.
Then I reported experimental results on free-riding, efficiency and spillover when
large or small teams produce open contents using non-modular or modular production.
Price (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary) often drives the allocation of resources.
However, it is sometimes difficult to measure the difficulty of a task, even less so by a
central authority. If price were used as a measure, it can only be a rather imperfect
signal. I documented a case in which price was at times not used to coordinate
resources in open contents where production was decentralized. Free-riding, measured
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as zero price to helpers, was prevalent in the experiment. Large teams were associated
with a higher free-riding level than small teams, and free-riding was more severe when
large teams work in a non-modular production environment. Free-riding resulted in
the removal of a signaling function of price for the difficulty levels of tasks. However,
this removal was not sufficient to lead to the catastrophic outcome of zero payoff. In
fact, for one measure of efficiency, small teams were more efficient than large teams
in the non-modular production and efficiency was higher in the modular production
irrespective of team size.
Lastly, I proposed and evaluated an anti-spam mechanism called uncensored com-
munication channel. Technical filters and legal rules raise the cost of delivering spam
to readers. Costs are borne by spammers (who must develop ever-changing techniques
for avoiding filters, etc.), but also by recipients, who spend time doing the difficult
filtering and reviewing that cannot be automated, and paying higher costs for goods
to cover the marketing expenses. On the other hand, an equivalent reduction in the
benefits of spamming (e.g. by moving out spam demanders) should have the same
incentive effect. I formalized this intuition and explored sufficient conditions for all
email recipients to be better off with the introduction of an open channel. I showed
that under these conditions only recipients wanting unsolicited commercial advertise-
ments will use the open channel, and they will benefit from less disguised messages
and lower sales prices. In addition, for all recipients the dissatisfaction associated






This section reviews some strategies discussed in the literature1. There is some
indication that one can have a different assessment of difficulty level of the same
posted game. This is because the number of remaining moves and time needed to
find the secret combination varies, which depend on the strategy one uses below.
Stepwise Optimal Strategy
Each guess is optimal in the sense that it is possibly the right answer, that is, it is
consistent with all guesses already played. Authors may define the term “consistency”
differently. This strategy does not have an expected number of guesses, but it is
guaranteed to find the solution in finite time.
A. Exhaustive Search by Koyama (1994): In a 4 peg, 6 color game, there are
64 = 1296 possible combinations. The strategy is to generate guesses with a computer
in sequence and then rule out the combinations that are inconsistent with the guesses
1I borrow heavily from Kooi (1986) and Merelo et al. (1999) to complete the literature review. I
thank Kooi for sending me the working paper.
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already played. For instance, if we start with AAAB, the next moves would be AAAC,
AAAD... up to AAAF and then AABA, and so on. As we move along, we will be
able to rule out combinations that receive no white or black pegs. The advantage of
this strategy is that it runs over the search space only once.
B. Random Search by Strobl (1998): This approach is similar to Koyama (1994)
except that it generates combinations randomly. Like the exhaustive search, there are
combinations that can be ruled out before being played, but it runs over the search
space more than once.
Analytical Strategy
Combinations that are known to be incorrect are played to reduce the search
space. Examples:
Pope (1995) In a 4 peg, 4 color game, we can determine what color is used and
how many times each color is used by making single-color moves in the first three
rows and using a different color each time (e.g. 1st move: AAAA; 2nd move: BBBB;
3rd move: CCCC).
This approach leaves us with five possible scenarios:
• Single-color combination (e.g. AAAA). In this case, we have solved the game
by the 4th move.
• 2-color combination with one color used three times and the other used once
(e.g. ABBB). This scenario presents 4!/3! = 4 possibilities. Let’s say we learn
that the colors are A and B (from the previous three moves). By placing A
in a different position each time in the next three moves, we can determine if
the combination is ABBB, BABB, BBAB, or BBBA and solve the game by the
7thmove.
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• 2-color combination with each color used twice (e.g. AABB). There are 4!/2!2! =
6 possible combinations. Similar to the above scenario, we can use the 4th, 5th,
and 6th moves to determine the position of A and solve the game in a maximum
of 7 moves.
• 3-color combination (e.g. AABC). In this scenario, we likewise use the next
three moves to determine which two slots color A is in. Let’s say if color A is in
slots 2 and 3, we are left with two possibilities: BAAC or CAAB. We will figure
out the positions of B and C in the 7th move and solve the game in 8 moves.
• 4-color combination. This is the most complicated scenario. We can determine
which color is in slot 4 by making the 4th move AAAB and, if necessary, the 5th
move CCCD.WLOG, let’s say color D is in slot 4. Then, in the 6th move we will
use the combination, AABD to get either 1, 2, or 3 positional matches. One
match means A is in slot 3 and thus leaves us with two possibilities: BCAD or
CBAD; Two matches indicates that the combination is either ABCD or BACD;
and three matches means it is either ACBD or CABD. In each case, we will be
able to identify the positions of the two remaining colors in the 7th move and
solve the game in a maximum of 8 moves.
Knuth (1976–77) This is the first paper published on solving MASTERMIND.
Knuth’s approach allows us to identify the combination after four moves. The ex-
pected number of moves is 4.478. The strategy is to choose a guess that minimizes the
maximum number of remaining possibilities at each stage. If several guesses satisfy
this condition, we will used the one that is a “valid pattern” and receives four black
pegs.
Figure A.1 adopts largely from a table in Koyama (1994). It shows us the number
of possible secret combinations that are consistent with the hints for each possible
optimal guess. The first column lists the hints which are combinations of black and
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Figure A.1: Uneliminated Secret Combination Candidates Consistent with Hints
Given to All Possible First Guesses
white pegs. The top row lists five possible choices for an optimal first guess.
The underlined cells in Figure A.1 represent the worst scenario for all possible
types of first guesses. According to Knuth, AABB should be played first since it
minimizes the worst scenario.
Others In Bestavros and Belal (1986), the strategy is based on information theory.
The technique is to obtain as much information as possible on the secret combination
with each chosen guess, be it on the average or in the worst case. With this algorithm,
the secret combination can be found in 3.9± 0.5 or 3.8± 0.6 average combinations in
a 4-peg and 6-color game. This strategy is an improvement on Knuth’s approach.
In addition, one can also minimize the number of parts described in Kooi (1986).




The next pages reproduce the instructions to subjects for the non-modular pro-
duction only1.
1The instructions for the modular production are largely except that there is no longer a group
requirement. Whenever person A solves a game (or someone solves a game A has posted), the points
A receive will automatically be shown as Period Earnings. The period earnings will be added to
the total earnings. In the information panel, the Potential Period Earnings and Group Requirement
Achieved cells are no longer there.
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Welcome. You are about to participate in an experiment that is approximately 2 hours long. You will be 
paid in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment will depend on the decisions you make. At 
various points of the instructions you will be instructed to work on short quizzes. When you have finished 
reading your instructions, raise your hand and the experimenter will come to check your answers before 
we start the actual experiment. If at anytime you have any questions, raise your hand and the 
experimenter will assist you. The experimenter will also entertain questions publicly when everyone has 
finished the instructions. 
 
The instructions are divided into five parts.  
I.    Standalone Games 
II.   Working with Games 
III.  Acquiring Games  
IV.  Structure of the Experiment 
V.   How to Use the Software 
 2 
 
I. Standalone Games 
 
In a standalone game, there is a combination-maker and a combination-breaker.  In each game, the 
computer will be the combination-maker and you will be the combination-breaker. 
 
For each game, the combination-maker will randomly generate a hidden combination of four pegs using 
six colors (blue, red, green, yellow, cyan, pink).  Colors can be used more than once. For example a 
combination can be (blue, blue, blue, blue), (red, cyan, blue, blue), (red, blue, green, pink), (green, pink, 
cyan, yellow), etc. If you have trouble seeing the colors, you can click on Display Color Numbers (see 
Figure 1 on P. 12; Area A).  
 
You have an unlimited number of chances to guess the hidden combination. For each guess, the 
combination-maker will give you a hint as to how close to the hidden combination you are.  If you have a 
peg in the correct slot and of the correct color, a black peg will be shown.  If you have a peg of the 
correct color but in an incorrect slot, a white peg will be shown. 
 
The black and white pegs for each hint refer to any of the four pegs you have chosen, not to any one 
specific peg. For instance, if the combination is (blue, green, red, yellow), and you guess (yellow, green, 






For each game solved, the experimenter will give out 10 points. For every 10 points you earn, you 
will be paid US$1. 
 
There is a group requirement: everyone has to make sure that all three of his allotted games in a period 
are solved either by himself or by other people in this experiment. You will only receive your earnings in a 
period if everyone solves all his games allotted in that period. In other words, if there is one game that is 
not solved in a period, none of you will receive your earnings in that period.  
 
The points you earn from solving a game will be shown in the field Potential Period Earnings. If Group 




Please work on Quiz 1 on P. 8-9 now. Continue with the 
instructions when you are done. 
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II. Working with Games 
 
When you are working on a game, there are three courses of action you may take: 
 
II.1 Completing a game 
You complete a game by guessing the hidden combination correctly. 
 
II.2 Storing a game to your Private Games Collection 
You may click on Work Later (see Figure 2; Area B). Doing so will transfer your game, with all of the 
guesses you have made, into your Private Games Collection. You may resume any of the games from 
your Private Games Collection at any time during the same period (see Figure 4; Area A). 
 
II.3 Posting a game 
You may decide to post a game by clicking Post (see Figure 2; Area C). Doing so will transfer your game 
and all of the guesses you have made into the Public Pool (see Figure 3; Area A).  
 
 The Public Pool: 
The Public Pool is a collection of games that are visible to all people in this 
experiment. 
Games in the Public Pool can be viewed and cloned by any people in this 
experiment.  When a person clones a game, an exact copy of the game with 
the history of moves and the same hidden combination is transferred to the 
person.  This person can work on this clone and take any of the three courses 
of actions listed above. 
Games in the Public Pool can be cloned multiple times by multiple people.  
When the original game or any clones of it is completed, all clones and 
the original become void and are no longer able to be worked on. 
 
If a person clones and solves your game, you will be awarded the number of points the game was 
worth, just as if you finished it yourself.  However, when you post a game you can choose the 
amount of commission you wish to pay another person for solving your game.  This number of 
points will be transferred from your account to his upon his completion of the game.  For instance, if you 
post a game worth 10 points and offer a commission of 4 points you will receive 10 points when this game 
is solved by another person. Four of these points will be given to the person who solves the game as 
commission. Thus, you earn 6 points and the other person earns 4 points 
 
Once your game has been posted, there is no way to control the circulation of it.  People may clone many 
copies of your game. You can, however, grab it back from the Public Pool. Doing so removes the game 
from the Public Pool so that other people can no longer clone it, but it does not affect the games people 
have already cloned.  
 
Since everybody is seeing the same instructions you do, everybody in your group is able to clone and 
post games as you are. 
 4 
III. Acquiring Games 
 
There are three ways to acquire games to work on: 
 
III.1 Request a game from the experimenter 
Each period, the experimenter allots three games for you to work on.  To request one of these games, 
you must click New Game (see Figure 1; Area B).  Each one of these games you complete will earn 
you 10 points. 
 
III.2 Clone a game from the Public Pool 
You may clone a game from the Public Pool to work on.  Each one of these games you complete will earn 
you the commission amount for that game. The commission is chosen by the person who posts the game 
(see Figure 3; Area B). 
 
III.3 Clone or Retrieve a Private Game 
At any time you may clone or retrieve games you have stored to your Private Games Collection (see 





Please work on Quiz 2 on P. 10 now. Continue with the 
instructions when you are done.
 5 
IV. Structure of the Experiment 
 
The experiment is divided into periods. At the beginning of each period, everything except Total 
Earnings will be reset. Note that your Period Earnings will be added to your Total Earnings. Any 
games in the Public Pool or your Private Games Collection will be discarded. 
 
A period ends when everyone has solved all three of his allotted games (i.e. Group Requirement 
Achieved becomes “true”), or in 7 minutes, whichever occurs first. The experimenter will make an 
announcement to remind you the remaining time when there are 2 minutes left in the period. 
 
In this experiment, there will be 10 periods and 1 trial period.  
 
 6 
V. How to Use the Software 
 
V.1 Your active game 
Your “Active Game” is the game in the left panel that you are working on. To make a guess, you must 
select a color for each of the four slots by clicking the slot and choosing the color from the drop-down 
menu.  Once you have selected four colors, click Check to submit your guess and see the hint for it (see 
Figure 2; Area A).  Note that once you have clicked Check you cannot change your guess.  
 
V.2 Work later 
You may store your active game to your Private Games Collection at any time by clicking Work Later 
(see Figure 2; Area B). This sends your active game to your Private Games Collection.  Your Private 
Games Collection is the list of games under the panel titled “Your Games” on the right side of the screen 
(see Figure 4; Area A). 
 
V.3 Posting 
To post your active game to the public pool, click Post.  A window titled “Post Options” will appear (see 
Figure 5). Here you can set the commission for this game. To the right of the window is a preview of your 
game as it will appear in the public pool. To cancel posting, exit the window by clicking the “X” in the 
upper right corner.  To post the game, click Post (see Figure 2; Area C). 
 
V.4 Acquiring games 
There are three ways to acquire a game: 
 
1) New game 
      You can request one of your three allotted games from the experimenter by clicking New    
Game (see Figure 1; Area B).     
 
2) Retrieving a private game 
You can retrieve a game from your Private Games Collection by looking at the list of games 
under the panel titled “Your Games.” Here you can see the basic information of the game: 
Name, Guesses, and Time Added (see Figure 4; Area A). 
 
Name 
This is the name of the game (in number). Note that a clone will have the same name as its 
parent game but with an extra level number. For example, a clone of Game 1 will have the 
name 1.1, and a clone of Game 1.1 will have the name 1.1.1 (see Figure 4; Area B). 
 
Guesses 
This is the number of guesses already made in the game. 
 
Time Added 
This is the time you added the game into your Private Games Collection. 
 
Clicking on one of the games in the list will load a preview of the game on the right hand 
side of the screen. You may then choose Clone or Retrieve (see Figure 4; Area C). 
Cloning simply creates a copy of the game and leaves the original in your Private Games 
Collection, while retrieving it takes it out of your Private Games Collection. 
 
3) Retrieving a public game 
You can browse games in the Public Pool list just as you can for those in the “Your Games” 
list. Here you also have all the basic information of the game. In addition to Name, Guesses, 
and Time Added, you also have Commission and Posted By (see Figure 3; Area A). Click 








This is the User Name of the person who posts the game. No participants will know which 
User Name corresponds to which participant. 
 
Click on a game to load a preview of the game on the right hand side of the screen. To 
clone and work on this game, click Clone (see Figure 3; Area B). If this game is yours, you 
will be able to Grab it out of the Public Pool.  Grabbing removes the game from the Public 
Pool so other people will no longer be able to view and/or clone it. But this does not affect 
the games people already cloned. 
   
Note: You can only acquire games when you do not have an active game.  If you have an active game, 
you must complete it or store it to your Private Games Collection in order to work on a new game. 
 
V.5 Information panel 
 
You can keep track of various statistics by looking at the Information Panel on the bottom right-hand part 
of the screen (see Figure 1; Area C). Here is the available information: 
 
 User Name 
Every person in this experiment is identified by a User Name (e.g. User 1, User 2, and so on). 
Your real name will be anonymous.  
 
Potential Period Earnings 
You will see an increase in your potential period earnings whenever you solve a game (or 
someone solves a game you post). The points you see here will be transferred to the field Period 
Earnings if Group Requirement Achieved becomes “True”. 
 
 Period Earnings  
This will be zero until everyone has solved all three of his allotted games.  
 
Total Earnings 
This is the amount of US$ you have accrued in ALL periods throughout the experiment. Your 
total earnings are simply the sum of your Period Earnings in dollars. 
 
Games Left for You 
This is the number of games left from the three the experimenter has allotted for you in the 
current period. If it reaches 0, you will not be able to request more games from the experimenter, 
but you will be allowed to work on public games. 
 
Your Allotted Games Solved 
This is the number of allotted games you have solved and/or the clones of your allotted games 
solved by others. 
 
Group Requirement Achieved is “False” until everyone has solved three of his or her allotted 
games. It will become “True” when this requirement is fulfilled. 
 
Time 
This is the current time. 
  
 
At the end of the experiment, the experimenter will come to each of you to record your total earnings. 








Please provide the hints (the black pegs and/or white pegs you expect to see) by 
writing B (black peg) or W (white peg) in the boxes provided.  
 
The numbers (1-6) in the circles represent the six different colors (blue, red, green, 
yellow, cyan, pink) that you will see in the actual experiment. However, in the 
experiment, you will see both the colors and the numbers (if you click on Display Color 
Numbers). 
 
Note: keep in mind that the position of the black and white pegs does not necessarily 
correspond to the positions of the guesses. Black pegs are always shown first (i.e. to the 
left of white pegs). 
 




  The hidden combination is 
 
    2         4       1      6 
 
Your guess is: 
  








1. The hidden combination is 
 
          2       3       1       5 
 
Your guess is: 
 











Person 1 posts a game with the name, Game 2, which is worth 10 points and sets the 
commission to 5. 
 
1. Person 2 clones this game. Therefore, the cloned game, Game 2.1 is created. How 
many points will Persons 1 and 2 each receive, if Person 2 solves Game 2.1? 
Person 1:     points 
 
 
Person 2:                 points 
 
 
2. After Person 2 has worked on Game 2.1, he however decides to repost it to the 
public pool and sets the commission to 3. Person 3 clones it, thereby creating 
Game 2.1.1. If Person 3 solves Game 2.1.1, how many points will Person 1, 2, 
and 3 each receive? 
 
Person 1:                 points  
 
Person 2:                 points 
 
Person 3:                 points 
 
 
3. Now if Person 3 has not solved Game 2.1.1, and Person 2 is still working on 
Game 2.1 after he has posted it. This means that Person 2 and Person 3 are 
working concurrently on Game 2. If Person 2 solves Game 2.1 first, how many 
points will Persons 1, 2, and 3 each receive? 
 
Person 1:                 points  
 
Person 2:                 points 
 





1. Each person is allotted three games. You have solved two of your own games that 
are worth 10 points each, and your third game is solved by another person whom 
you have agreed to pay 4 points to. However, not every person in this experiment 
has solved all three of his games yet. What will you see in the following fields? 
 




Games Left for You: 
 
Your Allotted Games Solved: 
 
Group Requirement Achieved: 
 
2. Now every person has solved three games, what do you see in the following fields? 
 




Games Left for You: 
 
Your Allotted Games Solved: 
 




Please raise your hand when you are done so the 







































Proof of Sender’s Best Responses

















− Cs(N os , N cs , tcs) (C.1)
The Lagrangian is:
L = π(·)− λc1(tcs − 1) + λc2(tcs −
1
f c
) + µoN os + µ




c, µo ≥ 0.
The complementary slackness conditions are:
λc1(t
c






) = 0 (C.4)
µoN os = 0 (C.5)





















Case 1: N os , N
c
s > 0 =⇒ µo = µc = 0.
(C.7) implies pos =
∂Cs
∂Nos








Subcase 1: tcs = 1 =⇒ λc2 = 0









Subcase 2: tcs =
1
fc
=⇒ λc1 = 0














(C.9) implies N cs
∂Cs
∂Ncs
= −tcs ∂Cs∂tcs .
Case 2: N os > 0, N
c
s = 0 =⇒ µo = 0.
(C.7) implies pos =
∂Cs
∂Nos







Subcase 1: tcs = 1 =⇒ λc2 = 0








Subcase 2: tcs =
1
fc
=⇒ λc1 = 0
(C.9) implies λc2 =
∂Cs
∂tcs
, which contradicts ∂Cs
∂tcs
< 0.







= 0, which is a contradiction because ∂Cs
∂tcs
< 0.
Case 3: N os = 0, N
c
s > 0 =⇒ µc = 0.
(C.7) implies ∂Cs
∂Nos







The subcase results of tcs are the same as Case 1’s.
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Case 4: N os = N
c
s = 0.
Subcase 1: tcs = 1 =⇒ λc2 = 0
(C.9) implies −∂Cs
∂tcs
≥ 0. (C.7) implies ∂Cs
∂Nos




Subcase 2: tcs =
1
fc
=⇒ λc1 = 0
(C.9) implies λc2 =
∂Cs
∂tcs
, which contradicts ∂Cs
∂tcs
< 0.



















































where µc, µo ≥ 0.
The complementary slackness conditions are:
µonoa = 0 (D.2)
µcnca = 0 (D.3)
FOCs:


















Case 1: noa > 0, n
c
a > 0.














Case 2: noa = 0, n
c
a > 0.













Case 3: noa = 0, n
c
a = 0.












Case 4: noa > 0, n
c
a = 0.
















Proof of Recipients’ Best Responses
For low-type recipients, vgr and v
II
r are zero anyway, but κ
o
r = 1 implies that v
I
r
only strictly increases (remains unchanged) if N or > (=)0. Thus, the best responses
for low-type recipients are κor = 0 if N
o
r > 0 and κ
o
r = 0 and 1 if N
o
r = 0. For high-type
recipients, there is no effect on Type II errors (equation (4.4)) because for the open
channel tj = f j = 1, so the term for j = o is zero. However, κor̄ = 1 implies that v
g
r̄
weakly increases for high-type recipients because of the max operator in (equation
(4.2)). For high-type recipients, the question then is whether the utility increase
with the increase in vgr̄ would at least offset the utility decrease with the increase in
vIr̄ . When N
o
r = 0, the best responses are κ
o
r̄ = 0 and 1 because both the changes
in vgr̄ and v
I
r̄ are zero. When N
o
r > 0 and N
c
r = 0, the best response is κ
o
r̄ = 1
because the utility increase in vgr̄ exceeds the utility decrease in v
I
r̄ . We must have
Ur̄(κ
o
r̄ = 1) − Ur̄(κor̄ = 0) > 0. When N or > 0 and N cr > 0, the best responses are




r̄ . In this




a, else both v
g
r̄ at best unchanged
but vIr̄ increases. Q.E.D.
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APPENDIX F
Proof of Nash Equilibrium















r. Assumption IV.2 implies
κ̂cr̄ = κ̂
c
r = 1. There are four cases.





a = 0 implies that v
g
r = 0 by (equation (4.22)). v
g
r = 0 =⇒ poa, pca = ∞




}(equation (4.2)). poa, pca = ∞ implies that the advertiser’s
maximization problem is not well defined, contradicting noa = n
c
a = 0 being the
solution.
Case b: n̂oa = 0, n̂
c
a > 0.











a, 0) = (p
o
aθ





a = 0 and n̂
c
a > 0
as a profit maximizer implies that πa(0, n̂
c





(i) When κor̄ = κ
c








last inequality is implied by p̂ca ≤ poa, which is true because nca > 0. Suppose otherwise
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r̄ = 1 implies v
g,c
r = 0 and θ
c = 0, violating the condition to




a− p̂csn̂ca ≥ 0 can’t be satisfied unless noa > n̂ca
because p̂cs > p
o
s (implied by Result IV.3 and the zero profit condition that makes the
weak inequalities in the best response strict). But noa > n̂
c
a contradicts with n̂
o
a = 0
and n̂ca > 0.
(ii) When κor̄ = 0,we have θ
o = 0. This implies that noa = 0 by Result IV.4.
We now check if nca = 0 or n
c
a > 0 constitutes part of the equilibrium, if any. If
noa = n
c
a = 0, it can’t be an equilibrium as explained in Case a. Else if n
o
a = 0 and
nca > 0, both recipient types could choose to opt-in or not as a best responses by
Result IV.5. When κor̄ = 1, we are back to (i), which we eliminated. κ
o
r̄ = 0 then
is the uneliminated best response for the high types. For the low types, κor = 1 and
0 are still the uneliminated best responses. To ensure n̂ca > 0 and n̂
o
















s by Results IV.3
and IV.4, and the zero profit conditions. We call this group of equilibria the status
quo Nash equilibria because κor̄ = κ
o
r = 0 is the same as in the status quo in terms of
decision made, and κor̄ = 0 and κ
o
r = 1 is the same as in the status quo in terms of
the utilities and profit realized.
Case c: n̂oa > 0, n̂
c
a = 0.
Result IV.5 implies that if noa > 0 and n
c
a = 0, κ
o
r̄ = 1 and κ
o
r = 0 is the best
response. What is left is to show that if κor̄ = 1 and κ
o
r = 0, n
o
a > 0 and n
c
a = 0
is the best response. Since tcs ≤ tos = 1 and κor̄ = κcr̄ = 1, we have θo ≥ θc. When
noa > 0, setting n
c




a to justify why recipients
buy from both channels (vg,or , v
g,c





that vgr̄ is the same whether n
c
a > 0. But for each fraction of v
g
r̄ satisfied by the sales
in the censored channel instead of the open channel, the decrease in noa has to be
compensated by an even greater increase in nca. With no increase in sales but the
need, by θo ≥ θ, to increase mail volume using the more costly censored channel,
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the profit is not maximized. The only best response left is noa = 0, which is already
eliminated in Case a.
To ensure n̂ca = 0 and n̂
o

















s by Results IV.3 and IV.4, and the zero profit conditions.
Case d: n̂oa > 0, n̂
c
a > 0.




a > 0 is not a best response.
When κor̄ = 0,we already showed in Case b (ii) that n
o
a > 0 is not a best response.
Thus, nca, n
o




Proof of Mail Volume Changes
























Since the advertiser’s problem gives p̂oaθ̂























c,∞f c) ⇐⇒ θ̂o (G.3)
For low-type recipients, they receive less mail because they don’t use the open channel
and the mail sent to the censored channel is zero.
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(ii) For the total volume received by all recipients:
∑
j
































s ≥ θ̂c,∞ca + ccst̂c,∞f c ⇐⇒ θ̂o ≥ θ̂c,∞ +
ccst̂





























r ≤ limfo→∞ v̂Ir (with v̂Ir < limfo→∞ v̂Ir ), and (c) v̂IIr ≤ limfo→∞ v̂IIr ,
we prove each of these inequalities below.












It holds for wr = 0 because both sides are zero. For wr̄ = 1, κ̂
o
r̄ = 1 by Result IV.5
and κcr̄ = κ̂
c,∞








which holds with strict inequality since p̂oa < p̂
c,∞
a . This is because p̂
c,∞




and p̂oa = ca +
p̂os
θ̂o

















c ≥ 1 and cc,∞s > cos).
(ii) Inequality (b) is v̂Ir ≤ limfo→∞ v̂Ir , or:
∑
j∈{o,c}
(1− wr + wrε)κ̂jr
N̂ jr
t̂jf j




For wr = 0, since κ̂
o












which is true because N̂ cr = 0 by Proposition IV.6. If N̂
c,∞
r > 0, the inequality will
hold with a strict sign.
For wr̄ = 1, N̂
c




r = 1 implies that (H.4) becomes (note that if
















(iii) Inequality (c) is v̂IIr ≤ limfo→∞ v̂IIr , or:
∑
j∈{o,c}
(1− ε)wrκ̂jrN̂ jr (1−
1
t̂jf j




It holds for wr = 0 because both sides are zero when ε = 0. For wr̄ = 1, since κ̂
o
r̄ = 1
by Result IV.5, κcr = κ̂
c,∞











which is true because N̂ cr = 0 by Proposition IV.6 and t̂
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